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THE SCHOLAR
I. THE MAKING OF A SAN ANTONIO LEGEND
Henry Barbosa Gonzalez was born May 3, 1916 in San Antonio, Texas.
The son of Mexican immigrants,' Gonzalez later emerged as a political
Legend.2
A victory for Gonzalez meant a victory for all Hispanics. Gonzalez
knew that his electoral successes constituted major landmarks in the His-
panic quest for political equality in the United States. He said of his early
election victories "each one of these was considered a breakthrough at
the time."3
As a member of the first generation of modern Hispanic officials, Gon-
zalez was instrumental in making widespread Hispanic political participa-
tion possible. Throughout his political life, Gonzalez consistently sought
to serve all of his constituents equally. He understood a "large and di-
verse electorate" and "overcame the harsh opposition of conservatives in
a community they had dominated for years."4 In doing so, he gained the
political support necessary to effectively represent his district for thirty-
seven years.' For instance, Mexican American voters exceeded all expec-
1. See Ronnie Dugger, Henry Gonzalez, His Life and Times, TEx. Olsetvmt, June
13, 1958, at 3; Hart Stilwell, Texas Rebel With a Cause, CORONET, Aug. 1958, at 43-47. His
father, Leonides Gonzalez, was forced to leave his position as mayor of Mapimi, Durango,
Mexico, during the political unrest of the Mexican Revolution in 1911. See id. Settling in
San Antonio, Leonides became Managing Editor of La Prensa, which he edited for forty
years. See id.
2. See Dugger, supra note 1; Stilwell, supra note 1, at 43-47.
3. 133 CONG. Rec. H6382 (1987) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez).
4. Letter from Henry B. Gonzalez, United States Congressman, United States House
of Representatives, to Michael Barone and Grant Ujufusa, Editors, Almanac of Anerican
Politics, 1988, NAT'L J., (Aug. 31, 1988) (on file with author). See also Henry B. Gonzalez,
Hope and Promise: Americans of Spanish Surname, AFL-CIO ArERICAN FnDI3itATIONISI,
June 1967, at 14. Gonzalez succinctly articulated the conflict of Hispanics in American
society when he wrote, that they were:
a "minority drawn between the powerful forces of conflict, the one demanding a pres-
ervation of its art, music, culture, language, architecture and dress; and the other tell-
ing it to get Anglicized or lose out in the race of life. For if a man slays within his
cultural minority and retains its customs, he has little chance to succeed in a world
which expects him to adopt its ways. He cannot get a job with only Spanish as a
language and he cannot expect anything but animosity if he fails to adopt the ways of
the majority. So, caught between the powerful forces demanding assimilation and a
tightly-knit and kept-minority status, assailed by demands to Anglicize and appeals for
staying "foreign," the Spanish-surnamed American is attempting to find a modus
vivendi-a way to live somewhere between the intolerable extremes." Id.
See also James (Jim) McCrory, HBG: The Man and the Myth, What Makes Henry B. Run,
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEws, Jan. 6, 1974, at 1.
5. See Michelle Garcia, My Talk With Henry B.: Looking Back at 37 Years of Serving
the People, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Jan. 3, 1999, at G3. Early in his tenure, Gon-
zalez's Hispanic constituents represented a minority of voters in the 20th District, which
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tations with a 75% turnout of the vote in Gonzalez's first congressional
race.6 The turnout gave Gonzalez a lead of more than 12,000 votes with
more than 90,000 votes cast in Bexar County, Texas.7 What made Gonza-
lez successful politically was his ability to create, maintain and expand
victorious coalitions that represented historic firsts in Texas and the na-
tion.8 Gonzalez built alliances within Texas and the Nation.'
Because many political refugees lived there, Henry Gonzalez described
San Antonio's Mexican community as a "country in exile within a city."'"
Young Henry walked a difficult path to be accepted in mainstream Amer-
ican society, which he found to be segregated and hostile. Speaking
Spanish exclusively until he was eight years old, he discovered Western
novels and then gravitated towards history, law, and philosophy."
As a young man, Gonzalez voraciously read the likes of Thomas Car-
lyle, Le Comte, Lockes, Hobbes, Descartes.' " Gonzalez began working
when he was only ten years old. 3 As a Mexican American raised in San
Antonio, the future Congressman experienced vicious racism. He be-
lieved that Hispanics at the time were "considered wholly a conquered
group, literally an enslaved group," very similar to African Americans. 4
For example, he witnessed Ku Klux Klan members riding throughout his
neighborhood late at night to threaten African Americans. He was called
a "greaser,"15 and was prohibited from entering many restaurants and
swimming pools reserved for whites only.'6 He graduated from Thomas
Jefferson High School and received an Associate Arts degree from San
Antonio Junior College in 1937.' 7
While serving in Naval Intelligence during World War II, Gonzalez
earned his Bachelor of Laws degree (LL.B.) from St. Mary's University
then comprised all of Bexar County, Texas, making it one of the most populous districts in
the nation. Id. See also McCrory, supra note 4.
6. See McCrory, supra note 4.
7. See id.
8. See Ronnie Dugger, Gonzalez of San Antonio: The Establishnent, Tu-x. OIinLI:VL it,
Oct. 17, 1980, at 3.
9. See Garcia, supra note 5; McCrory, supra note 4.
10. 133 CONG. REC. H6382 (1987) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez).
11. See Dugger, supra note 8. See also Dugger, supra note I.
12. See Dugger, supra note 8. See also Duggcr, supra note 1.
13. See Stilwell, supra note 1, at 45 (stating Gonzalez made $11.50 a week for working
75 hours).
14. See 133 CONG. REC. 14,768, 14,769 (1987) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez).
15. See WEBSTER's NEW UNIVERSAL UNAUIIImEI) DI(-rIONAttY 798 (2d ed. 1983)
(defining greaser as "a Mexican or Latin American: hostile and contemptuous termi.")
16. See 133 CONG. REc. 14,768, 14,769 (1987) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez); Stilwell,
supra note 1, at 44.
17. See Dugger, supra note 1; Stilwell, supra note 1. at 43-47.
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School of Law in San Antonio, Texas in 1943.18 Overcoming the hard-
ships of his youth, combined with the promise of President Franklin Del-
ano Roosevelt's New Deal, Gonzalez formed his abiding belief that
government could greatly improve the lives of disadvantaged people.
19
Congressman Gonzalez would hold these beliefs throughout his career.
After graduating from law school, Gonzalez worked as a juvenile pro-
bation officer. Subsequently, Bexar County Judge, Charles Anderson,
appointed him as the County's Chief Probation Officer in 1946.20 Gonza-
lez considered the four years working as a probation officer to be the
"most satisfying and most inspiring years and the ones that educated me,
because those years were the equivalent of three or four college
degrees."2
Before entering politics, Gonzalez assisted his father with a translation
service by acting as a language and business consultant from 1947 to
1951.22 He also helped form the Pan American Progressive Association
("PAPA") and served as the organization's executive secretary.23 PAPA
consisted of Hispanic leaders from education, business, and other profes-
sional fields.24 Intending to help impoverished Hispanics; the organiza-
tion fought restrictive covenants that discriminated against Hispanics in
housing.25 He left the group after being criticized for representing Afri-
can American tenants in a court battle against a restrictive covenant. 26
Henry B. Gonzalez's political campaigns during the tumultuous 1950s
and early 1960s, particularly his campaign for Congress, catalyzed politi-
cal breakthroughs for Hispanics in overcoming discrimination and achiev-
ing political equality throughout the United States.
18. See Ronnie Dugger, Conversations with a Congressman: Gonzalez of San Antonio,
Apr. 11, 1980, at 22; Stilwell, supra note 1, at 44.
19. See Letter from Henry B. Gonzalez, United States Congressman, United States
House of Representatives, to Michael Barone and Grant Ujufusa, editors, NAT'L J. (Aug.
31, 1988) (on file with author); Stilwell, supra note 1, at 43-47.
20. Dugger, supra note 8, at 15; Gonzalez Heads Juvenile Office, SAN ANI'oNIO
LIGHT, July 3, 1946, at B1.
21. See 133 CONG. Ruc. 20,277 (1987) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez).
22. Dugger, supra note 1. See also Stilwell, supra note 1, at 43-47.
23. See Dugger, supra note 1; see also Stilwell, supra note 1, at 43-47.
24. See Dugger, supra note 1; see also Stilwell, supra note 1, at 43-47.
25. See Frances Jerome Woods, M.A., Mexican Ethnic Leadership in San Antonio,
Texas, 31 CArH. UNIV. OF AM. STUDIES IN SOC. 1, 102 (1949). See also Dugger, supra note
1.
26. See Dugger, supra note 1; Interview with Kelsay Meek, former Staff Director,
Banking Committee, United States House of Representatives, in San Antonio, 'lx. (Feb.
24, 2001).
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II. THE Frsor BR iAK'rIROUGItS
An articulate man with a desire to improve the lives of the unfortunate,
Gonzalez was a member of a generation of Mexican Americans who
sought to maintain their cultural identity while joining mainstream politi-
cal and economic life in the United States. 27 This generation of Hispanics
emphasized seeking equality and inclusion in the nation's political sys-
tem.28 Through successive dramatic electoral breakthroughs, they con-
vinced the political establishment that Hispanics had the political skills
and willingness to share in governing the nation.
Gonzalez came of age when Hispanics were enjoying unprecedented
opportunities. Labor shortages caused by World War II provided His-
panics with employment opportunities that had previously been closed to
them.29 These gains, however, did not provide economic equality with
Anglo Americans. In the late 1940s, Hispanics increasingly sought equal-
ity and were more willing to protest institutionalized discrimination.
30
Hispanics joined the Civil Rights movement, seeking economic, political,
and social equality. Mexican Americans first confronted segregation in
education, recreation, restaurants, housing, and politics." Gonzalez,
himself, credited World War II for destroying "barriers so that [his] emer-
gence into politics was in that vein of one of the first bearing a name such
as [his] to break through the then ... and still to a certain degree tightly
controlled.., political, social, and economic" power of San Antonio."2
After World War II, Hispanics enjoyed a new spirit of hope by ad-
vancements through education, political involvement, and community
leadership. As a group, Hispanics became increasingly involved in efforts
to obtain local political representation, civic improvements, and fairness
in the judicial system. In an atmosphere of developing political maturity,
new Hispanic political leaders were beginning to emerge. During this
27. See RICHARD A. GARCIA, Risr o- "lif- MEXICAN AMERICAN MInoL.L CIA&S: SAN
ANTONIO 1929-1941, at 305 (1991). See generally Richard A. Garcia, Class, Consciousness,
and Ideology-The Mexican Communnity of San Antonio, Texas: 1930-1940, 9 Az-t.,, 23, 55
(1979) (describing the goals in political arenas while maintaining a Mexican community).
28. See R.A. GARCIA, supra note 27, at 303 (identifying the push for knowledge and
power to fight all forms of discrimination).
29. See id. at 302. See also Armando Navarro, The Evolttion of Chicano Politics, 5
AzTLAN 57, 66 (1974) (examining how increased job opportunities in factories led to politi-
cal social change).
30. See Navarro, supra note 29 (discussing the increase in political activity by Chica-
nos in the interest of confronting various social issues).
31. See R.A. GARCIA, supra note 27, at 205; Woods, supra note 25, at 31-34; Ramon
Garces, Latit Vote Grows, Tex. OnsERvr:R, Apr. 2, 1957, at I (detailing the political dis-
crimination encountered).
32. See 133 CONG. Rtc. 20,276 (1987) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez).
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time, a movement called the Politics of Social Change developed.33 The
movement represented the Hispanic political experience, and focused its
action on removing the inequalities directed against Hispanics.3 4 In addi-
tion, it worked towards achieving goals such as better employment oppor-
tunities, higher quality education, adequate housing, and political
representation.35
Gonzalez represented the emergent political movement, particularly in
the early part of his political career during which he championed integra-
tion and focused on improving political and economic status for Mexican
Americans.3 6 Describing his early career, Gonzalez wrote that "[t]he
keystones of his politics were fairness, economic progress, and genuine
hope of those who had been left out and left behind."37
Gonzalez advocated the cause of those least represented in politics
against considerable odds. For Mexican Americans and African Ameri-
cans alike, such advocacy included abolishing public discrimination based
on race and ethnicity. The demand for equal treatment included intcgra-
tion into the American democratic process.38 The politics of status, how-
ever, did not advocate radical change, it was based on the premise that it
was possible to eliminate inequalities through the established political
system. The fight to quash the politics of status, including the struggle for
democratic political rights, was a significant part of the political evolution
of Mexican Americans, and Gonzalez played a major role in the
process.39
33. See Roberto E. Villarreal, The Politics of Mexican American Empowernent, in
LATINO EMPOWERMENT: PROGRESS, PROBLEMS AND PRosPE(-rs 4 (Roberto E. Villarreal,
et al. eds 1988). See generally Navarro, supra note 29, at 66-71 (placing the movement's
existence between 1945 and 1965).
34. See Navarro, supra note 29.
35. See id.
36. See, e.g., Dugger, supra note 1; Stilwell, supra note 1, at 43-44.
37. Letter from Henry B. Gonzalez, United States Congressman, United States House
of Representatives, to Michael Barone and Grant Ujufusa, Editors, Almanac of Anerican
Politics, 1988, NAT'L J., (Aug. 31, 1988) (on file with author).
38. See RODOLFO ACUJ$A, OCCUPIED AMERICA: A HiSToRy OF CHICANos 359-62
(4th ed. 2000) (describing the growth of the Chicano youth movement and its call for inclu-
sion); R.A. GARCIA, supra note 27, at 254, 308-09 (illustrating the Mexicali American
struggle for equality and integration); EVERETr C. LADD, JR., NEGRO POLIrICAi. LEADER.
SlIP IN THE SOUTH 156 (1966). Status goals involved the pursuit of integration of public
facilities and services for groups that had been historically viewed as inferior. See id. Wel-
fare goals focused on more immediate "gut" needs such as higher wages, better housing
and medical care, child safety and influence on expenditure of tax dollars. /d. at 155.
39. See LADD, supra note 38, at 156 (discussing the politics of status for African
American communities in the South); RODOLFO ROSALES, TIHE ILLUSION OF INCLUSION:
THE UNTOLD PoIICAL STORY OF SAN ANTONIO 98 (2000) (identifying the various times
in Gonzalez's career that he aggressively pushed for integration and equality).
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Mexican Americans, such as Gonzalez, interpreted status goals largely
in political terms. Hispanics in San Antonio, faced pervasive racial dis-
crimination and segregationa ° Mexican Americans lagged far behind
Anglos in jobs, wages, education, and political representation. at Political
discrimination was therefore justified primarily on the notion that His-
panics were not qualified for political office due to lack of education.
Many Anglo Americans viewed Mexican Americans "as being incapable
of holding office... [because they were thought of as] just menial labor-
ers." 2 Gonzalez shattered this view by fighting for accommodation in
politics and successfully entering the political arena. Gonzalez believed
that his participation in politics was a way "to prove to... Hispanics that
the system could work for them, and to Anglos that Hispanics were a
responsible part of the community."4 3
Gonzalez ran for a state House seat during the 1950 Democratic pri-
mary with no outside financial support, and spent only $200 on his cam-
paign."a Gonzalez never dreamed, much less planned, of entering politics
prior to entering this race.a" However, he entered the race because he
believed that Bexar County needed a full-time juvenile/domestic rela-
tions court.46 Immediately after entering the race, Gonzalez demon-
40. See Woods, supra note 25, at 28-36 (providing examples of the blatant discrimina-
tory beliefs and practices of many in San Antonio during the 1930s and 1940s). See also
Dugger, supra note 18, at 20 (discussing Gonzalez's memories of discrimination in San
Antonio).
41. See R.A. GARCIA, supra note 27, at 54-217.
42. Nancie L. Katz, "The People's Congressman": Sering Constiluents Was Hallnark
of Gonzalez's 36 Years on Hill, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 16, 1997. at AI (quoting Claro Car-
reon, a former Gonzalez campaign worker).
43. Letter from Henry B. Gonzalez, United States Congressman, United States House
of Representatives, to Michael Barone and Grant Ujufusa, Editors. Almanac of American
Politics, 1988, NAT'L J., (Aug. 31, 1988) (on file with author).
44. See Henry B. Gonzalez, A Maverick on the Hill, AUSLiN ANIERICAN-SIA I I-".SAN,
Mar. 2, 1986, at D53 (noting the $200 expenditure for his senate campaign): James (Jim)
McCrory, Vice President? His Fans Go for ft, But Not HBG, SAN ATroNO -xio ,Rs-
Nn-ws, Jan. 7, 1974, at 8A (reviewing Gonzalez's various campaigns, including his first run
for Senate).
45. 133 CONG. REC. 14,768 (1987) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez). Reflecting on his
career during a statement before the House, Gonzalez stated that lie had never "planned.
intended, or even dreamed of" a career as a public official. Id. His first political defeat in
the 1950 race for Texas Senate; he stated, "I had felt then that the integrity and the honor
of an American citizen participating in these wonderful glorious free democratic processes
of which we rightfully boast, above all had the supreme duty and commitment to defending
that integrity and that honor and after over thirty four years of service in an elective public
capacity, I am no richer, no poorer then (sic) when I started." /L.
46. See Gonzalez, supra note 44 (quoting Gonzalez expressing his desire to establish a
juvenile/domestic relations court); New Bill Readied, SAN A1'arONto Expiitss-Ni-ws, Dec.
26, 1956 (showing Gonzalez reviewing a bill requesting the establishment of a domestic
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strated his political finesse by forming an alliance with Maury Maverick,
Jr., candidate for another seat in the Texas House from San Antonio,
which combined the votes of Anglo progressives and Hispanics. Al-
though he lost this first race, he accomplished two important things in
that election.47 First, he politically energized the Hispanic west end of
San Antonio, which gave an early indication that Hispanics were becom-
ing increasingly effective in resisting segregation and gaining more equal-
ity. Second, the race positioned Gonzalez as a convincing Mexican
American political leader.48
Gonzalez's political career began in earnest when he campaigned for
city council.4 9 In this campaign, as in all of his campaigns, Gonzalez fo-
cused on issues such as effective government, rather than ethnic politics.
He advocated the politics of accommodation by seeking to represent peo-
ple from many different backgrounds. His detractors believed that a His-
panic could not win a countywide office because Hispanics were
perceived to lack the political skills and resources to conduct an effective
campaign, and that a Hispanic could not attract substantial support in
rural and suburban areas.50 As a group, San Antonio Hispanics were not
as politically oriented as they would later become and had only a minor
impact on local politics despite their proportion of the city's population. 5'
Running on the "San Antonionian" ticket, Gonzalez was elected to the
San Antonio City Council in 1953.52 His election was historic because it
ended the long exclusion of Hispanics from the City Council. During his
relations court in Bexar County); New S.A. Courts Urged Here, SAN ANTONIO ExIu'ss-
NEWS, Jan. 21, 1957.
47. See Katz, supra note 42 (reflecting on the early successes of Henry B. Gonzalez);
Dugger, supra note 18, at 3.
48. See Interview with Kelsay Meek, supra note 26.
49. See Katz, supra note 42; Dugger, supra note 18, at 20.
50. See generally Katz, supra note 42 (paraphrasing Bill Sinkin, a longtime Gonzalez
friend); Gonzalez, supra note 44 (quoting Gus Garcia, a prominent Hispanic leader of the
time). See also Bexar District Boundaries, SAN ANTONIO ExI'REss-NIws, June 1, 1965, at
B1. All Texas State Representative candidates ran countywide in multi-member districts
until 1966. Id.
51. See R.A. GARCIA, supra note 27, at 29; ROSALES, supra note 39, at 11. In 1950,
39.3% of San Antonio's population was Hispanic, 53.5% Anglo and 7.0% African Ameri-
can. See id.
52. See Satz Antonians' File Complete Nine-Man Ticket, SAN ANTONIO Exi'Russ-
Niws, Mar. 4, 1953, at 1; Jon Ford, Jack White, Gonzalez Only Winners: San Antonians'
Lead Most Races, 7 Runoffs Are Due, SAN ANTONIo EXPREss-NEws, Apr. 8, 1953, at 1.
See generally McCrory, supra note 44 (noting that San Antonians were opposed by the
Good Government League (GGL), which was composed largely of residents from the
northern part of the city, along with a very few Mexican Americans and African
Americans).
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first term, Gonzalez became the city's first ever Hispanic Mayor Pro
Tem.5 3 He survived that tumultuous first term.54
Some of Gonzalez's fellow Council members initially viewed him as
"an ethnic representative," whose role was to "legitimize the existing
power structure from the top down."5 In aggressively pursuing a reform
agenda, Gonzalez was not the "tame Mexican" that some Council mem-
bers expected.56 Instead, Gonzalez's independence and political courage
angered the conservative political establishment. Often, Gonzalez was at
the lonely end of eight-to-one votes on the Council. He recalled the posi-
tion as, "the hardest political job I ever had."57 In 1955, the people
elected Gonzalez for a second term as an independent, largely because
his reformist efforts separated him from the Council's majority."s He
won re-election, despite spending only $750, $250 of which he
borrowed.59
Segregation emerged as the most controversial issue in Gonzalez's re-
election bid. Throughout his tenure on the City Council, Gonzalez cham-
pioned civil rights and opposed segregation of public facilities. Before
Brown v. Board of Editcation,6 0 the city enforced segregation based on
state law and custom.6' San Antonio never had a segregation ordinance
until the Council passed one shortly after Brown.'2 Gonzalez urged the
53. See McCrory, supra note 44.
54. See Profile of A Public Man: Texas Congressnan Henry B. Gonzalez. Nt,,nTo,
Mar. 1983, at 13.
55. See Paul Sweeney, Hottest Henry, U. S. BANKER, Feb. 1989, at 22.
56. See Profile of A Public Man, supra note 54, at 14. See also Dugger, upra note 8.
at 20.
57. See Maury Maverick, Henry B's Valtes, Spirit Still at Work for Public, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESs-NEws, July 19, 1998, at G3.
58. See ROSALES, supra note 39, at 70 (describing his tumultuous start in politics);
Letter from Henry B. Gonzalez, United States Congressman. United States House of Rep-
resentatives, to William H. Reddell, Editor, SAN ANTrNIO Exrl-ttuss-Nrws (June 30. 1973)
(on file with author); H.B. Gonzalez to Run Again, SAN ANToNio ExImuss-NEws, Jan. 27,
1955 (on file with author). See, e.g., League inl Council Race, Gonzalez Will Be Unopposed.
SAN ANToNIo EXPRESS-NEws, Mar. 5, 1955, at 1; Jack White Ticket il SA Race. SAN
ANTONio LIGHT, Mar. 6, 1955 (on file with author).
59. See 133 CONG. Rrc. H6382 (1987) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez); see also Letter
from Henry B. Gonzalez, United States Congressman, United States House of Representa-
tives, to William H. Reddell, Editor, San Antonio Express-News, (June 30, 1973) (on file
with author).
60. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
61. See Gonzalez, supra note 44.
62. See Record Fillibuster Ends, Bill is Passed, Fo tt WoR-1t StAl. 'ILL., May 3.
1957. S.A. Scheduled to Open City Pools to Negroes, SAN ANrONIO Exi',iss-N:ws. Mar.
15, 1956. The June 19, 1954 Ordinance sets aside nine pools for the exclusive use of white
persons, and two for use by Negroes. See id. The new ordinance would open all city-
owned pools to both Whites and Negroes. See id.
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repeal of all ordinances segregating public recreational facilities. In 1956,
he authored and campaigned for an ordinance that abolished segregation
of public facilities.63 Gonzalez recalled that as a child, he was ordered to
leave one of the city's swimming pools because he was Mexican Ameri-
can, so this victory was particularly sweet.64 While serving on the City
Council, Gonzalez consistently demonstrated his integrity by never ac-
cepting money, nor making deals. He spoke his conscience and his con-
stituents revered him for it. Moreover, he portrayed impeccable
character, which dispelled the racist stereotype of a corrupt and incompe-
tent Mexican politician.65
In 1956, Gonzalez made another bid for the State Senate. In an upset
victory, he narrowly defeated a conservative Anglo, longtime incumbent,
Ozzie Latimer. He was finally declared the winner after three recounts. 66
Gonzalez's victory was of historic significance because he defeated the
existing power structure and won a Senate district that encompassed all
of Bexar County, which no Mexican American had ever done before.67
No Hispanic had ever served in the Texas State Senate since 1846 and
Gonzalez was the first elected Hispanic State Senator in Texas history.6"
While in the Texas Senate, Gonzalez gained national recognition by fili-
bustering against several segregation bills.69
In 1957, Texas was one of the southern states that actively attempted to
circumvent school integration, as mandated by Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.7" Ten bills were introduced in the Senate that session to maintain
segregation. During the 1957 regular session, Gonzalez conducted a two-
man, 36-hour filibuster against two of the ten "race bills", along with Sen-
ator Abraham (Chick) Kazen, Jr. of Laredo.7" This was the longest fili-
63. See Interview with Kelsay Meek, supra note 26; S.A. Speeds Pool Ban Repeal, SAN
ANTONIO LiGirr, Mar. 15, 1956; S.A. Scheduled to Open City Pools to Negroes, supra note
62.
64. See, e.g., Gonzalez, supra note 44; S.A. Speeds Pool Ban Repeal, supra note 63;
S.A. Scheduled to Open City Pools to Negroes, supra note 62. See Dugger, supra note 18, at
8; Stilwell, supra note 1, at 43.
65. See Profile of A Public Man, supra note 54 at 13.
66. See Carmina Danini, Henry B. Dies, Lawmaker Leaves a Grand Legacy, SAN
ANirONio EXPREss-NEws, Nov. 28, 2000, at Al. Gonzalez won the election by 309 votes
after three recounts. Id. See also Katz, supra note 42; Political Career of Henry B. Gonza-
lez, SAN ANTONIO EXP'RESS-NEws, Nov. 29, 2000, at A8.
67. See Gonzalez, supra note 44; See also Katz, supra note 42.
68. See Dugger, supra note 8, at 15. Antonio Navarro, a native Texan of Spanish-
Italian descent, was appointed state senator in 1846 and served one term. See Id. at 22. See
also Lee Giffen, Henry Gonzalez of Texas, CATHOLIc Di(;Es'r, Oct. 1963, at 14.
69. See Dugger, supra note 8, at 22; Ronnie Dugger, Texas Christians Stem the 7de,
CHRISTIAN CENTURY, July 31, 1957, at 914.
70. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
71. See Stilwell, supra note 1, at 43.
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buster in Texas history.72 Gonzalez said at the beginning of his lonely
monologue, "I seek to register the plaintive cry, the hurt feelings, the
silent, the dumb protest of the inarticulate., 73 Drawing on his own expe-
rience of suffering ethnic discrimination, Gonzalez said, "It may be some
can chloroform their conscience. But if we fear long enough, we hate,
and if we hate long enough, we fight."'74 The courts eventually struck
down the two bills that did pass. 75
In a special legislative session called in September 1957, shortly after
the Little Rock school integration crisis, 76 Gonzalez again filibustered;
however, he spoke alone for twenty consecutive hours opposing three
more anti-civil rights bills. 77 Among the opposed bills was Governor
Price Daniel's bill allowing the State of Texas to close schools threatened
by disturbances involving integration and the possible use of federal
troops. 78 The first special session failed to act on these bills; therefore
Governor Daniel called a second special session. Once again, Gonzalez
filibustered. This time all three of the bills, including the so-called "Troop
Bill" became law.7 9
Gonzalez risked his career in the filibusters because very few non-Afri-
can American public officials at the time would defend their rights in
Texas, and his district had relatively few African American voters. Gon-
zalez ended his filibusters, tired with his clothes wrinkled, winning a
moral victory."0 His stand was a major step forward in the State's pro-
gress toward racial equality that otherwise might have been delayed
indefinitely.
72. See id.
73. See Dugger, supra note 8, at 23; History in Texas: A Filibuster AGAINST Jim
Crow!, THE SOUTHERN PATRIOT (Southern Conference Educ. Fund Inc., New Orleans,
LA), May 1957, at 1.
74. For Whon the Bell Tolls, TIME, May 13, 1957, at 27.
75. See Avery v. Wichita Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., 241 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1957) cert.
denied at 353 U.S. 938, 77 S. 816, 1 LEd.2d 761 (1957); Rippy v. Borders, 250 F.2d 690 (5th
Cir. 1957).
76. See Michael Rowlett and Michael R. Wickline, louse Debates, Approves Bates'
Holiday, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZEITI'E, Jan. 26, 2001 (reviewing then Governor Orval
E. Faubus' Actions in 1957 when he sent the National Guard to block school desegrega-
tion); Little Rock School htegration Hits New Roadblock, N.Y. Tihs, July 2, 1989, at 16.
77. Stilwell, supra note 1, at 43.
78. See Daniel's Troop Bill Stymied by Senate One-Man Filibuster, SAN ANTONIo Ex.
PREss-NEws, Nov. 22, 1957; Gonzalez Gives Up: Filibuster Lasts 20 Hours, SAN AmIoNto
LIGHT, Nov. 22, 1957, at Al; Gonzalez Launches Senate Filibuster: Solon Aims to Delay
Troop Bill, SAN ANTONIO LIGHT, Nov. 21, 1957, at Al.
79. See Dawson Duncun, Troop Bills Pass Easily, DAtU.AS Ntiws Nov. 23, 1957; Segre-
gation Resolution Introduced, SAN ATrrONIO ExiREss-N-ws, Oct. 16, 1957, at 1.
80. See Record Filibuster Ends, Bill is Passed: Eight More Race Items Face Fight, FoRT
WORTH STAR TELE., May 3, 1957, at Al.
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In 1958, Gonzalez ran as the liberal alternative to the popular Gover-
nor Price Daniel in the Democratic gubernatorial primary. Daniel's only
significant opponent at that time was former Governor and United States
Senator W. Lee "Pappy" O'Daniel.8 ' Both opponents were veteran
members of the Texas political establishment. Although Gonzalez lacked
the name recognition of his opponents, he had the support of labor un-
ions, African Americans, Hispanics, and liberals.82 Gonzalez was both
the first Mexican American candidate and the first Catholic to run for
governor; however, he did not run as an ethnic or religious candidate.83
With anti-Hispanic bigotry entrenched at the time, some believed that his
ethnicity constituted "a rather crippling handicap."84 Although Gonzalez
was defeated, he gained respect and prestige statewide, remarking,
"elected officials and candidates for office in Texas now speak more dis-
creetly on the question of equal rights.
85
In the 1960 presidential election, John F. Kennedy obtained Gonzalez's
help in organizing the Viva Kennedy Clubs throughout the country.
86
Gonzalez, along with other prominent Hispanic politicians, served as na-
tional co-chairmen.87 The Viva Kennedy Clubs played a crucial role in
the Kennedy-Johnson victory in Texas and represented the first national
partisan political effort by Hispanics as an organized group.88 The pri-
mary goal of the Viva Kennedy Clubs was to elect John F. Kennedy and
81. Letter from Henry B. Gonzalez, United States Congressman, United States louse
of Representatives, to Ronnie Dugger, Editor of TEXAS OBSERVER, (Oct. 28, 1965) (on file
with author). See Gonzalez, supra note 44; James (Jim) McCrory, Losing Can Be Fun Too.
Fearless Henry B. Went It Alone, SAN ANTONIO ExI'Russ-Nnws, Jan. 6, 1974; Don Wil-
liams, Busy Schedule Doesn't 7ire Senate Contender Gonzalez, FOlT WORTll STAR "I'I.E.,
at 8.
82. Ronnie Dugger, Charlatans and Heroes, TEX. OBSERVER, Apr. 1986, at 164-67;
Letter from Henry B. Gonzalez to Ronnie Dugger, supra note 81.
83. See, e.g., Garcia, supra note 5 (recounting Gonzalez's pride in the efforts lie made
to represent all of his constituents equally); Gonzalez, supra note 44; Katz, supra note 42
(reporting Gonzalez's resistance of "being pigeon-holed into ethnic corner").
84. Letter from Henry B. Gonzalez to Ronnie Dugger, supra note 81.
85. Giffen, supra note 68, at 83-87; MeCrory, supra note 81.
86. See IGNACIO M. GARCIA, VIVA KENNEDY: MEXICAN AMERICANS IN SEARCH OF
CAMELOT 54 (Robert A. Calvert & Maria Christina Garcia gen. eds., 2000). See also Inter-
view with Kelsay Meek, supra note 26.
87. See GARCIA, supra note 86. Among the most prominent Mexican American poli-
ticians in the country were Henry B. Gonzalez and Edward Roybal who both supported
Kennedy for President. See iM. at 43. They along with U.S. Senator Dennis Chavez be-
lieved that creating an organized Latin American effort in support of Kennedy would bring
national attention to the needs of Mexican Americans. See id. at 44. As a result, the Viva
Kennedy Clubs were formed to carry out this agenda while coordinating the Mexican
American vote. See id. at 47.
88. See POLITICAL ASSOCIATION OF SI'ANISHI SPEAKING ORGANIZA'I IONS (PASO),
THE HARRIS COUNTY PASO FACT BOOK 9 (1964).
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Lyndon B. Johnson, but also of critical importance, they helped organize
and register Latino voters.89 Hispanics supported the Democratic ticket
because of the party's endorsement of civil rights, school desegregation,
equal opportunity, fair housing, voting rights, and legislation to protect
the rights of migrant workers (the first such commitment by the
Democrats). 90
Gonzalez won reelection to the State Senate in 1960, with strong victo-
ries against a conservative Democrat in the primary, and then, a con-
servative Republican in the general election.9' In 1961, Gonzalez ran in
the special election that was called to fill Lyndon Johnson's Senate Scat.' 2
Of the seventy-one candidates in that race, he placed sixth statewide, but
a strong first in Bexar County; confirming, as he had in 1956 and 1960,
that he had significant support in Bexar County to win higher political
office.93
III. A BREAKTHROUGH HOUSE ELtC-1r1ON
Gonzalez's opportunity to run for higher political office became availa-
ble in 1961, when longtime Congressman Paul Kilday, resigned from the
United States House of Representatives to serve as a federal judge. 9'
Gonzalez, with support from the Kennedy Administration, became the
Democratic candidate for the seat.
The special election was a clear liberal-conservative choice between
Gonzalez and John Goode, Jr., a former GOP county chairman.9s The
contest assumed national importance because it was the first congres-
sional race during Kennedy's term. The race was interpreted as a test of
the popularity of the New Frontier programs and of Kennedy's own per-
sonal popularity in a traditional Democratic stronghold. 6 In the hotly
contested race, Gonzalez became the first Hispanic elected to the United
89. See, e.g., ACUNA , supra note 38, at 338; GARCIA, supra note 86 at 85.
90. See GARC(A, supra note 86 at 74-84. See, e.g., ACURA , supra note 38. at 329-30.
91. See McCrory, supra note 81.
92. See Gonzalez in Race to Stay: Henry Calls Himself "Unreconstructed Liberal,"
TEx. OBSERVER, Jan. 28, 1961, at 1.
93. See McCrory, supra note 4; Don Politico, Gonzalez, GGL S.A. Winners, SAN
ANTONIO LIGHT, Apr. 5, 1961, at 1. See generally Tom McGowan, No Money, Some Votes:
Gonzalez Philosophic, SAN ANTONIO LUGHT, Apr. 5. 1961, at 32 (discussing Gonzalez's die
hard supporters).
94. See Goode Hoping Ike's Magic Touch Will Work for ilim, Hotus. C11RoN., Aug.
11, 1961; Goode Hoping Ike's Magic Touch Will Work for Hin. Hous. CHRON.. Aug. 11,
1961.
95. See McCrory, supra note 4.
96. See id. See, e.g., Gonzalez Gets Backing of Ralph Yarborough. SAN AN-ON) Ex.
PRESS-NEws, Oct. 4, 1961; Ralph Gives Strong Backing to Gonzalez, SAN AN I oNIO LuIrt,
Oct. 3, 1961; Goode Hoping Ike's Magic Touch Will Work for Him, supra note 94.
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States House from Texas.97 His win came at a time when his district was
only 40% Mexican American.98 Although Mexican Americans, at the
time were poorly organized and generally most did not vote, during this
election, Mexican American voter turnout was 75% in Bexar County.99
Despite the strong show of support made by the Mexican American mi-
nority, Gonzalez refused to run as an ethnic candidate; instead, he em-
phasized that he would represent all of his constituents equally regardless
of race, religion or class. 00 Gonzalez remarked, "I have always been
against self-segregation ... I never believed that the way to win equality
is through separation ... You have to have allies ... to go into the main-
stream and fight things out there, not on the margin."' 0 '
After winning the special election, Congressman Gonzalez brought his
battle for equal opportunity to the national level. During his tenure,
Gonzalez led efforts to reform the social order and help minorities and
the poor.10 2 Gonzalez consistently stood by his promise to serve all per-
sons in his district fairly and equally, without favoring any particular eth-
nic group.0 3 Additionally, he played an essential role in the progress of
the Civil Rights movement as it advanced toward equality and inclusion
despite considerable resistance."0 4 In 1962, the legislature redistricted
Gonzalez's district and reduced it to largely central San Antonio, which
encompassed most of Bexar County's Hispanic neighborhoods. In that
same year, Gonzalez was reelected to the House without opposition in
either the Democratic primary or the subsequent general election.'0 5
IV. CONGRESS' CHAMPION OF THE COMMON MAN
In Congress, Gonzalez was a tenacious and productive champion for
the poor and those of modest means. Some of his best-known legislative
97. See McCrory, supra note 4.
98. In 1960, 41.5% of San Antonio's population was Hispanic, 51.2% was Anglo. See
ROSALES, supra note 39, at 11.
99. See McCrory, supra note 4.
100. See Garcia, supra note 5; Interview with Kelsay Meek, supra note 26.
101. See Garcia, supra note 5.
102. Id. See An Effective Representative, He Works for the Whole Commu1nity, SAN
ANrONio ExPREss-NEws, Sept. 10, 1966 at 10A (noting Gonzalez's conmitment to serve
his entire constituency was widely recognized).
103. See Garcia, supra note 5.
104. See ROSALES, supra note 39, at 102.
105. See Goode, Onion Fade Fron Senate Race, SAN ANToNIo ExiREss-Nnws, Jan.
13, 1962; GOP Enters 26; Gonzalez Is Unopposed, SAN ANTONIO Exi'itss-Nuws, Feb. 6,
1962.
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accomplishments were his works on behalf of the Great Society and New
Frontier programs, including individual rights, and housing.' 6'
As a lawmaker, Gonzalez helped promote the message of the Hispanic
"Social Change" movement by promulgating civil rights legislation.1
0 7
From the beginning of his congressional career, he championed the na-
tional, liberal, social, and economic agenda, defending the rights of the
poor and minorities in the fields of housing, small business, community
development, and consumer protection.
A. Advocate of the New Frontier and Great Society
Henry B. Gonzalez, guided by an egalitarian social vision derived from
Franklin D. Roosevelt's "New Deal" and later John Kennedy's "New
Frontier" programs, quickly established his liberal credentials by strongly
supporting the Kennedy programs, especially those on civil rights."°S His
views and voting record consistently reflected a classic liberal Democrat
in the New Deal tradition, with his strong support of federal spending in
housing, education, and health care. He described himself as an "un-
reconstructed American fighting liberal of the old school."'" 9 Gonzalez
strongly supported President Kennedy's New Frontier program, including
efforts to create the Housing and Urban Development Department, the
Manpower and Development and Training Bill, Peace Corps expansion,
and the foreign trade bill.
Early on in the administration of President Lyndon Johnson, Gonzalez
worked closely with Minnesota Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-MN) to
successfully enact the social welfare legislation that formed the "Great
Society."1 0 Gonzalez himself said the programs were "designed prima-
rily to help those who are in most need of help: the poor, the children, the
uneducated, the unemployed, the migrant farm workers, the aged, the
sick, the dependent, and the oppressed.""' Long after President Johnson
106. See, e.g., An Effective Representative, He Works for the Whole Cotn1nunity, supra
note 102; Gonzalez Pleads for Braceros, SAN AroNto Exrtsss-Nnws, Mar. 5. 1963: Sub-
committee Oks FSLIC Bailout Plan, SAN ANTONIo Exri-ss-Nws, July 1, 1987.
107. See Christine Marie Sierra, it Search of National Power: Chicanos Working the
System on Inunigration Reform, 1976-1986, il CHICANO PoUnCs AND SocnE-ry INu 111
LATE TWENTIEH CENTURY 139-40 (David Montejano ed., 1999) (stating that "in coordi-
nating their legislative activity around specific issues, "the Caucus sought 'to develop a
united congressional effort on behalf of Hispanic Americans"').
108. See McCrory, supra note 4.
109. Gonzalez in Race to Stay supra note 92.
110. See An Effective Representative, He Works for the Whole Coimmnunity; supra note
102.
111. Henry B. Gonzalez, Congress With a Heart, WI-sisit) SUN, Nov. 4, 1965.
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left office, Gonzalez continued to defend the vision of the Great Society,
particularly its emphasis towards civil rights of minority groups.' 1
2
B. Crusader for Individual Rights
Gonzalez was an outspoken supporter of civil rights, which he viewed
as a moral issue. He demonstrated his commitment to equal rights early,
when he stunned Congressional segregationist colleagues by not only em-
ploying an African-American secretary, but by being the first southern
representative to do so. Gonzalez hired Cora Fay Clayton, a recent Our
Lady of the Lake College graduate, shortly after he took office. 1 3 Years
later, Gonzalez discovered that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
had included his actions, such as hiring practices, while he was a State
Senator in its dossier on him.114
Henry B. Gonzalez was heavily involved in all of the major civil rights
legislation from the 1960s to the 1990s. In Congress, he consistently sup-
ported civil rights measures beginning with his opposition to the poll tax,
the practice of charging admission to the polls." 5 The poll tax was a
long-standing impediment to the exercise of voting rights by African
Americans and Mexican Americans in Texas. Texas was one of five states
that still had such a tax for state and local elections. 1 6 During Gonza-
lez's early public career, most Mexican Americans could not vote because
they had not paid a poll tax or were not registered to vote after the poll
tax was abolished because of unrealistic early deadlines and the lack of
voter education."17
112. See An Effective Representative, He Works for the Whole Commtunity, stupra note
102 (paraphrasing Lyndon B. Johnson); Sie Helps Little People, SAN AN'roNIo Exl.'lss-
NEws, Mar. 2, 1969, at A24.
113. See Sie Helps Little People, supra note 112. See also Interview with Kelsay Meek,
supra note 26.
114. The FBI had been keeping a dossier on Gonzalez since he served in the state
senate. On the day after his election to the Congress, the local agent in charge sent a
memo to J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI, asserting that State Senator Henry B.
Gonzalez, liberal democrat has just been elected to the Congress with Communist help.
See Interview with Kelsay Meek, supra note 26.
115. See 110 CONG. REc. H2312 (1964) (statement of Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez).
116. See Donald S. Strong, American Government and Politics, The Poll Tax: The Case
of Texas, 38 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 693, 697 (1944). Texas adopted the poll tax in 1902. See
id. Its proponents argued that it was a means to pay for state and local elections and to
prevent election fraud. See id. at 697-98. Its effect was to discourage the poor from voting.
See id. at 701.
117. See Poll Tax Finally Abolished! Registration Thru Mar. 6, The Congressman
from Bexar Reports (Henry B. Gonzalez Newsletter, Bexar County, TX), Jan.-Feb. 1964,
at 1. See also Donald S. Strong, American Government aizd Politics, Tile Poll 7tx: The Case
of Texas, 38 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 693, 700-01 (1944).
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When Gonzalez first came to Congress, he stressed the importance of
abolishing the poll tax. He said, "You can't have one half of the citizenry
sunken in oppression without affecting everybody. You can't hold a man
down unless you get down with him."' 8 With that, he introduced his first
bill." 9 While previous bills had abolished the poll tax in national elec-
tions, Gonzalez's bill would also abolish it in local and state elections.
Congress voted on August 29, 1962, to amend the Constitution to elimi-
nate the poll tax with the proposed Twenty-Fourth Amendment, which
eventually became a part of the United States Constitution in 1964.112 In
1966, the United States Supreme Court, in Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections,12 ' ruled that the poll tax in state and local elections violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, and abol-
ished all poll taxes.122
Early in his tenure, Gonzalez focused his concern on the plight of farm
workers, particularly those in the Bracero Program. t " During the early
1960s, he campaigned to terminate the Bracero Program, which allowed
workers from Mexico to harvest crops in the United States. He criticized
the program for the deplorable conditions under which laborers
worked. 24 Throughout much of 1963, he opposed extending the existing
Mexican farm labor legislation through 1964." z  He argued that Public
Law 78,126 which authorized the Bracero Program, promoted slave la-
bor 27 due to its use of foreign labor for harvesting agricultural crops.
The Bracero Program also prevented American agricultural migrant
118. Garcia, supra note 5.
119. H.J. Res. 594, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). Henry B. Gonzalez introduced this
bill, which would repeal the poll tax. Id. See also Poll Tax Fiially Abolished!, supra note
117.
120. U. S. CONsTr. amend. XXIV § 1. See also Interview with Kelsay Meek, supra note
26.
121. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
122. See id. at 666. The poll tax in federal elections was finally abolished with the
ratification of the 24th Amendment on January 23, 1964; Texas retained the poll tax in state
and local elections until it was declared unconstitutional in 1966. See Poll Tax Filally
Abolished!, supra note 117.
123. See GARCfA, supra note 86 at 36. This bilateral agreement between tle United
States and Mexico was designed to provide Mexican workers with better working condi-
tions and some legal protections. Id. Some political groups charged that tle program re-
sulted in unemployment and lowered wages for Mexican American workers. Ild.
124. See 109 CONG. REc. 11,216 (1963) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez).
125. See 109 CONG. REc. 9,809 (1963) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez): 109 CoNG. REV.
11,216 (1963) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez).
126. See Title V - Agricultural workers, Pub. L. No. 78, 63 Stat. 1051 (1951) (repealed
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-203, 77 Stat. 363 (1963).
127. See Title V - Agricultural Workers, Pub. L No. 78, 63 Slat. 1051 (1951); 109
CONG. REC. 9809 (1963) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez).
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workers from competing freely for jobs.1 28 The program, which had ini-
tially been characterized as temporary, began in 1941 and was renewed
without difficulty, indicating a permanent nature.1 29 President Kennedy
eventually announced his opposition to extending the program, which
was eventually abolished in 1965.13' While defending the rights of these
temporary workers, Gonzalez also fought for the rights of migrant work-
ers, including the right to decent housing.'
31
Throughout much of 1963, Gonzalez became the target of bitter hostil-
ity when he opposed additional appropriations for the House Committee
on Un-American Activities (HUAC). Gonzalez said he voted this way
primarily because the committee had received the highest committee al-
lowance and yet only produced three bills during its existence.' 32 He also
believed that the committee's functions would be better served under the
jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee. 133 Conservative and patriotic
groups sharply criticized his vote.
On October 29, 1963, Congressman Ed Foreman (R-TX) asserted that
Gonzalez and the other nineteen House members who had voted against
this bill were "pinkos.' ' 134 During the 1950s and early 1960s, critics of
HUAC charged that the committee ruined many people's reputations and
careers merely because they advocated certain liberal causes.' 35
128. See House Okays Ending Mexican Labor Import, SAN ANTONIO ExPRuss-Nuws,
May 30, 1963, at IA.
129. See 109 CONG. REC. 1,048 (1963) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez); 109 CONG. Re('.
11,216 (1963) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez); Bracero Law End Welcomed, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEws, May 30, 1963; see Gonzalez Pleads for Braceros, supra note 106; HINRY
B. GONZALEZ, Bracero Program, NEWSLE'rrER, Apr.-Jul. 1963, at 1; HENRY B. GONZA-
miz, Bracero Bill Newsletter, Aug.-Sep. 1963, at 1-2.
130. See Title V - Agricultural Workers, Pub. L. No. 78,63 Stat. 1051 (1951) (repealed
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-203, 77 Stat. 363 (1963)); 111 CONG. REc. 8602-03 (1965) (statement
of Rep. Gonzalez); see e.g., House Kills Bracero Bill, SAN ANTONIO Lioirr, May 30, 1963.
131. See 109 CONG. REC. 10,271-72 (1963) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez),
132. See, e.g., Gonzalez Defends Vote, SAN ANTONIO Lioirr, Jan. 20, 1964.
133. See id. See also Ned Curran, Gonzalez Explains Vote on HUAC Money, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESs-NEws, Mar. 14, 1965, at 2B.
134. See Rep. Gonzalez Slugs Ed Foreman, EL PAso HERALD-POST, Oct. 29, 1963;
Pinko Charge Triggered Gonzo, SAN ANTONIO LIihT, Oct. 30, 1964. See also 109 CONG.
Rrc. 20,108-09 (1963) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez). The term "pinko" is defined as a
"person with left-wing, but not extreme, political opinions" and is considered to be a de-
rogatory term. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1472 (2d ed.
1983).
135. The House Un-American Activities Committee originated with the establish-
ment of the Select Committee on Un-American Activities Committee (the Dies Commit-
tee) in 1938. It was made a standing committee - The House Un-American Activities
Committee or HUAC. In 1969 its name was changed to the Committee on Internal Secur-
ity. In 1975, the committee was abolished and its jurisdiction transferred to the Judiciary
Committee. The committee was charged with investigating 1) the extent, character and
[Vol. 3:1
CHAMPION OF SOCIAL EQUALITY
Gonzalez was one of twelve Southern Democrats who voted for the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,136 compared with ninety-two who opposed it. 37
He was also one of a handful of Southern Democrats who voted to ex-
tend the life of the Civil Rights Commission. 38 Shortly after a church
bombing in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1963, Gonzalez obtained a special
order from House Speaker John McCormick (D-MA) to address the
House regarding civil rights.' 39 Twenty colleagues, both Democrats and
Republicans, supported him in this effort. He continued to strongly sup-
port the civil rights movement, by actively backing many civil rights bills,
including the Equal Rights Amendment of 1970.40
Gonzalez never "traded on racism or ethnicity."'"' He also opposed
separatism based on race or ethnicity although some minority groups did
advocate separatism in response to white supremacists who resisted de-
segregation. Gonzalez realized that members of ethnic minority groups
also had real differences, in experiences, beliefs, and values, which pro-
moted the tendency toward separation.' 42 Gonzalez believed, however,
that it was a mistake for minorities to risk permanent exclusion from
mainstream American life, thus becoming economically and politically
marginalized.' 43
Gonzalez also believed that separatism harmed Anglos. Essentially
Gonzalez believed that separatism deprived all ethnicities of the knowl-
objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, 2) the diffusion within
the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from for-
eign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government
as guaranteed by the constitution, and 3) all other questions in relation thereto that would
aid Congress in any necessary remedial regulation. See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 486
(1987). See also Erica Bose, Comment, Three Brave Men: An F-ranination of Three Attor-
neys Who Represented the Hollywood Nineteen in the House Un-American Activities Com-
mittee Hearings in 1947 and the Consequences They Faced, 6 UCLA ENT. L Rt~v. 321
(1999).
136. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West 2000); E.W. Kenworthy, Civil Rights Bill Passed By
House in 290-130 Vote; Hard Senate Fight Seen, N.Y. Tihrms, Feb. 11, 1964. at Al.
137. See Kenworthy, supra note 136.
138. See, e.g., Editorial, A Difference in 25 Years, St. Pi---lT.s,u; Tuhws, July 2, 1989,
at 2D (remarking on the successes of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, specifically the exten-
sion of the Civil Rights Commission).
139. See Gonzalez Blasts Silence on Civil Rights, Dispute. SAN ANTromio ExIRtmss-
NEvS, Oct. 18, 1963.
140. See Henry B. Gonzalez, SIGNOE DiscIIARWE P1371TIoN To BRiN. Li~sLtxIo,
TO DEBATE AND VOTE, Niswsturrr-R, June 19, 1970; ERA Loses Close Vote in House,
Hous. PosT, Nov. 16, 1983.
141. 133 CONG. REc. 20,276 (1987) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez).
142. See, e.g., IGNACIO GARCIA, UNITED WE WIN: Tim: RISE AND) FAUt oi- L.- RAZA
UNIDA PARTY (1989); Interview with Kelsay Meek, supra note 26.
143. See Gonzalez: Minorities Must "Join Mainstream" to End Injustices, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESs-NEws, Jan. 6, 1971.
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edge and understanding that comes from interaction with people of dif-
ferent cultures. He believed that in the face of pervasive and egregious
prejudice against certain minorities, implementing affirmative action
could even the playing field.' 44
C. Progressive Watchdog on the Banking Committee
Throughout his tenure in Congress, Gonzalez served on the Committee
of Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs. There, he sought to make credit
more accessible to ordinary people, improve public housing, and help
many Americans become homeowners. 145 Gonzalez was assigned to the
Banking and Currency Committee 46 due largely to the influence of his
mentor, Representative Wright Patman (D-TX).147
Gonzalez quickly became a leader on the Committee and worked to
pass the New Frontier 148 and Great Society legislation.' 49 The Commit-
tee had jurisdiction over matters in which Gonzalez had specific interest
and experience, matters pertaining to financial institutions, international
finance, public housing, and price controls. Along with serving on the
Banking Committee throughout his congressional tenure, Gonzalez also
served as a member of the subcommittees on housing, consumer affairs,
and international finance.' 50
144. See id. See also Letter from Henry B. Gonzalez, United States Congressman,
United States House of Representatives, to Preston Smith, Texas Governor (Nov. 5, 1969)
(on file with author); Interview with Kelsay Meek, supra note 26. Gonzalez recognized
that there should be some limits to affirmative action. See id..
145. See John W. Milligan, Quixote at the Gate, U.S. BANKER, Nov. 1993, at 4 (criticiz-
ing one of Gonzalez's ideas, but acknowledging that he cared about the little guy); Robert
M. Garsson, Gonzalez Sets Hearings to Gauge Adequacy of Bank Fund Recap, AMERICAN
BANKER, Dec. 5, 1991, at 14 (quoting Gonzalez as claiming that any future banking legisla-
tion would "include a quid pro quo for the little guy"); Peter G. Gosselin, Frank a Power
on Banking Bill; Mass. Liberal Joins Forces with Conservative on Overhaul, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 4, 1991, at 1 (noting that Gonzalez has long worried about banks overlooking
the little guy). See also Interview with Kelsay Meek, supra note 26.
146. In 1977, this Committee was reorganized and became the Banking, Finance, and
Urban Affairs Committee. W. BROWN, CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL AND RutES
or ilto HOUSE OF REPRESENTA'VES H. R. Doc. 94-663, 95th CONG., 2d SEss. (1977);
Political Career of Henry B. Gonzalez, supra note 66.
147. See A 20th Century Program for the 20th District. Banking and Currency Commit-
tee Assignments, Tuir CONGiESSMAN FROM BEXAR REPORTS (Henry B. Gonzalez Newslet-
ter, Bexar County, Tex.), Jan.-Feb. 1963.
148. See Washington Talk: Capital Hill; Modesty Becomes Newest Kennedy, N.Y.
TiME, Oct. 5, 1987, at A18 (noting the alliance Gonzalez had with the Kennedys).
149. See Joe Holley, Principle Over Politics: Fight More Important Than Was the Out-
come, SAN ANrONIO EXPREss-NEwS, Dec. 2, 2000, at 8A (naming Gonzalez as one who
"enthusiastically embraced" the Great Society Programs).
150. 87th CONG. 7 (1962) (statement of Rep. Ralph R. Roberts). See also Political
Career of Henry B. Gonzalez, supra note 66.
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On the Banking Committee, Gonzalez repeatedly supported competi-
tion and stability in the financial industries and advocated responsiveness
to the needs of the consumer. He warned of the impending savings and
loan crisis, as well as the commercial banking crisis years before those
industries collapsed."' In the 1980s and 1990s, he stressed the need to
investigate the relationship of high-level government officials and Sad-
dam Hussein prior to the Persian Gulf War.'5 2 He charged that an im-
proper relationship involving the use of Banca Nazionale del Lavoro
(BNL), the United States Commodities Credit Corporation, and certain
goods exported to Iraq by United States companies existed."5 3
D. Crusading for Affordable Housing
An area where Gonzalez was both productive and passionate was
housing, which was one of his major concerns from the time he was first
elected.15 4 Throughout his career, Gonzalez was a staunch supporter and
friend of low-income communities and indigent housing programs. In-
deed, he became one of Congress' most committed champions for afford-
able housing; continuing on a national level the work he began early in
his career in San Antonio. 55
Gonzalez made a lifelong career of defending the interests of "the lit-
tle guy." He never forgot that while he pulled himself up by his own
bootstraps, there are many people without boots. He fought homeless-
ness, illiteracy, and sickness among the poor by championing for legisla-
tion to alleviate these problems. His biggest contribution, according to
U.S. Representative Barney Frank (D-MA), was his endless campaign for
public housing and other programs for low-income Americans. Repre-
151. See Gary Martin, Henry B. Calling It Quits: After 36 Years in House Gonzalez
plans to Resign at Year's End; Cites Health, Family Concerns, SAN AworoNIO Exmi'rss-
NEWS, Sept. 4, 1997, at Al. See also IIBG Accuses Foes of Whisper Campaign, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEwS, Feb. 2. 1991, at Al.
152. See 138 CONG. REC. 28,344-53 (1992) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez.); Natalie
Gott, Thousands of the Alighty and the Meek Gather to Honor Late Congressman, Asso(-.
PRESS, Dec. 2, 2000, at 1, available at http'/ww.txdcmocrats.org/henryb.htm; Political Ca-
reer of Henry B. Gonzalez, supra note 66.
153. See 138 CONG. REC. 18,144-54 (1992) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez); 138 CoNG.
REC. 28,344-53 (1992) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez).
154. See Janet Reilly Hewitt, Congressman Gonzalez: A Defender of lousing, RI-Alt
ESTAm FINANCE TODAY, Sept. 1984, at 1. See generally IIBG Bill Would Fight Foreclo-
sures, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEws, Feb. 25, 1982 (providing mortgage assistance to
homeowners receiving a foreclosure notice).
155. See, e.g., Hewitt, supra note 154; Melissa Dribben, Gonzalez Lashes Reagan
Housing Stance, SAN AtrroNIo Ltcrr, Apr. 21, 1981; Deborah Weser, Gonzalez Says FHA
'Fading', SAN Ar'rONIO LiGc'r, Mar. 21, 1981. See also Interview with Kelsay Meek. supra
note 26.
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sentative Frank remarked that, "Gonzalez used his leverage to help poor
people. When it was unfashionable, he was really a rock for economic
justice."' t5 6 Gonzalez's advocacy of economic justice was felt most in his
efforts to ensure adequate housing for all Americans.
Prior to becoming Chair of the House Banking Committee, Gonzalez
was involved in the passage of the landmark Housing Act of 1964.157
Housing legislation, including that which protected and enhanced the
public housing program, remained a priority all his life. His amendments
modernized and brought more equitable treatment to those persons who
were displaced from, or deprived of, their property through eminent do-
main resulting from Federal urban renewal or slum clearance projects. 58
In Congress, Gonzalez faced a dual challenge: the escalating cost of
housing versus certain political pressures to reduce the federal role in
assuring affordable housing. In the 1970s and 1980s, affordable housing
declined for most Americans as the cost of homes increased dramati-
cally. 159 Real personal income also declined and fewer people had sav-
ings to invest in homes. 60 In the 1980s and 1990s, however, three
presidents attempted to reduce funding for programs that assist people in
obtaining housing. 16' Gonzalez emphasized the problem by directly ad-
dressing it to Congress: "We continue in a deep crisis with respect to pro-
viding shelter for the overwhelming preponderant majority of those who
are poor or moderate-income people in our country."'' 62
156. See Dave Harmon, His Crusades Over, Henry B. Returns Home: San Antonio
Democrat Leaves His House Seat After 37 Boisterous Years in Congress, AusrIN Amriu.
CAN-STATESMAN, Jan. 3, 1999, at Al.
157. Pub. L. No. 88-560, 78 Stat. 769 (1964) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12, 20, 38, 40 U.S.C.).
158. See Area Redevelopment Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-55, 79 Stat. 195 (1965);
Gonzalez was a constant supporter of the Kennedy and Johnson era housing proposals,
including the Housing Act and the Area Redevelopment Act. In fact, lie cast the deciding
vote for the Area Redevelopment Act in committee in 1965. Id.
159. See Hard Times Seen for Public Housing, SAN ArrONIO ExPi'tzss-NBws, Fob. 7,
1981; Roger Langley, Gonzalez Criticizes U.S. Budget-Cutters on Housing, SAN ANTONtO
LIGHT, May 21, 1981; Bob Richter, Gonzalez's Housing Bill Due for Vote Next Week, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, May 14, 1986, at 4A; Weser, supra note 155.
160. See Edward Ff. Zeigler, Jr., The Twilight of Single Family Zoning, 3 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L. & PoL'y 161, 177 (1983) (detailing reasons for the high costs of housing during
this time period); District Voters Guide: Ward 1: Democrats, U.S. Labor and Socialists in
Race, WASH. Pos-r, Sept. 7, 1978, at 6 (describing opinions on the high cost of housing in
the 1970s).
161. See Ed Cafasso, Menino Wary of Fed Budget, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 9, 1994, at
12; Joe Fohn, Gonzalez: Reagan Setting Housing Back 40 Years, SAN ANTONIo ExI'Iuss-
NEws, April 21, 1981, at 2A (describing President Reagan's reduction of housing pro-
grams); David Lauter, Bush Seeks Voluteer Efforts Against Social Ills, L.A. "lINes, June
23, 1989.
162. 132 CONG. REc. 33,660-67 (1986) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez).
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In 1981, Gonzalez became the Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Housing and Community Development (now the Housing and Commu-
nity Opportunity Subcommittee).' 63 The Democratic Caucus of the
House Banking Committee continuously re-elected Gonzalez as Chair of
the subcommittee, the largest subcommittee in the House of Representa-
tives for fourteen years, until January 1995 when the Republicans as-
sumed control of the House.1
64
Perhaps more than any other congressman, Gonzalez worked to pre-
serve the federal housing programs after the election of Ronald Rea-
gan. 16- Prior to the Reagan administration, the federal government had
made housing assistance available through several programs.'6 6  One
such program assisted families who faced home foreclosures.' 67 As Chair
of the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development in 1981,
Gonzalez led efforts to obtain approval for a program to assist families
who faced foreclosure on their homes."6 He strongly defended public
housing programs against several reduction attempts by the Reagan
Administration.169
While Housing Subcommittee Chair, Gonzalez made extensive tours of
migrant camps; later, the workers often recognized him.17 0 In a camp in
Maryland, a young mother with tears in her eyes said, "Mr. Gonzalez, we
163. See HBG Namned Housing Chairman, SAN AmioNmo Exit'iuss-Nws, Jan. 28,
1981.
164. See Pickett Takes the Lead for Mortgage Industry, MoRrAGE MARKI -nLA(-.,
Dec. 19, 1994, at 1 (noting that Republican Rick Lazio of New York had taken over Gon-
zalez's postion).
165. See HUD Still Has Housing Needs to Meet, SAN Dut*;o UNION-TRIi., Oct. 24,
1989, at B6; Christopher Marquis, Henry Gonzalez, 84; Sen,ed 37 Years ii House, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 28, 2000, at A33; Political Career of Henr), B. Gonzalez, supra note 66 (stating
that Gonzalez, after becoming Chairman of the House Subcommittee of Housing and
Community Development in 1981, worked to block cuts in federal housing programs by
President Reagan).
166. See Alan C. Miller, Key Committee; Beilenson, Berman Win Budget Posts, LA.
TIMEs, Jan. 5, 1989, at 8.
167. See id. See also Ongoing Foreclosures Reach New High, FAcs ON FILtE WoRU)
NEvs DIGEs-r, June 10, 1983, at 428.
168. See Ongoing Forclosures Reach New High, supra note 167 (quoting Gonzalez as
claiming that there was "no question that a continuing emergency situation" existed with
regard to families facing foreclosure).
169. See Robert P. Hey, Shortage of Low-Income Housing in U.S. Worsens. Clitus.
"nAN ScL MONrrOR, May 16, 1986, at 3 (illustrating Henry B.'s position that the Reagan
administration's approach to affordable housing bordered upon "criminal negligence").
170. Letter from Kelsay R. Meek, former Chief of Staff for Congressman Henry B.
Gonzalez, United States House of Representatives, to Chris Anglim, Government Docu-
ments Librarian, Sarita Kenedy East Law Library, St. Mary's University School of Law,
(Aug. 5, 2000) (on file with author).
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don't want to live this way. We have no choice."'' Another camp in that
area was a former prisoner of war (POW) camp, which was still being
used for migrant housing. 72 Gonzalez never ceased in his passion for
decent, affordable housing for all Americans. 73 He understood this
need, ever since his days as a juvenile officer assisting juveniles who
lacked the necessities of life and lived in wretched, corral housing with
dirt floors.
174
Gonzalez successfully established an urban homestead program -- he
protected the immediate future of the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) 175 and protected the Urban Development Action Grant Program
(UDAG), which were threatened with elimination by the Republicans. t76
Despite Gonzalez's vehement protests, the 97th Congress (1981-1982)
complied with President Reagan's requests to significantly reduce the
1982 fiscal year housing budget. Congress also met Reagan's request to
ease federal controls over Community Development Block Grants
(CDBG's), and agreed to Reagan's proposal to combine the UDAG and
CDBG programs. 177 By 1989, the UDAG program was eventually
eliminated. 1
78
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. See also Interview with Kelsay Meek, supra note 26.
175. Congress first authorized the FHA in 1934. See William E. Nelson & Norman R.
Williams, Suburbanization and Market Failure: An Analysis of Government Policies Pro-
noting Suburban Growth and Ethnic Assimilation, 27 FOROFIAM Uiui. L.J. 197, 227 (1999).
The agency's single-family insurance program was intended to encourage home ownership
and to stimulate it by encouraging banks to lend to people who cannot afford a down
payment. Id. See also Peter W. Salsich, Jr., A Decent Home for Every American: Can the
1949 Goal Be Met?, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1619, 1621 (1994). Gonzalez and the rest of Congress
were able to keep urban development and public housing assistance programs alive via
temporary authorizations. Id. See also Richter, supra note 159.
176. See, e.g., Dribben, supra note 155; Fohn, supra note 161; Langley, supra note 159;
David Shribman, Housing Reemerges as a Central Issue, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1983, at 4;
Weser, supra note 155; Congressman Gonzalez: A Defender of Housing, REAL Es'r. FIN.
TODAY, Sept. 1984, at 1, 6; Emergency Action Revives FHlA Loans, SAN ANrONlO Ex-
1'RESS-NrEWS, May 1, 1986; Emergency Legislation Enacted to Revive FHA Ability to Insure
Home Mortgages, Assoc. PRESS, Apr. 30, 1986; HBG Says Hottsing Survived Reagan, SAN
ANTONIo LIGHT, Apr. 24, 1984; Measure to Revive FHA Sent to Reagan, SAN ANIONIO
LIGfT, June 25, 1986; Selling the FHA: A Zany Proposal, WEr SIDE SUN, Jan. 9, 1986, at
10.
177. See Congressman Gonzalez: A Defender of Housing, supra note 154; IBG Says
Housing Survived Reagan, SAN ANTONIO LIGHT, Apr. 24, 1984; Langley, supra note 159.
178. See Edward Walsh.... As Cities Reel From Reagan Era Cutbacks; Urban Leaders
Call for New Approach to Address Deeper Causes of Unrest, WASI. Posr, May 3, 1992, at
A25 (acknowledging the dismantling).
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In the 98th Congress (1983-1984), Gonzalez's bill to reauthorize hous-
ing and community development programs was attached to legislation
funding the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The attachment of
these programs to the IMF legislation was an effort to force the President
to accept the housing legislation. Gonzalez voted against his own bill be-
cause he objected to the way it was combined with IMF funding.'79 The
legislation was then attached to a supplemental appropriations bill, which
was passed and signed into law. 8 '
During the 102nd Congress, Gonzalez attempted to revitalize several
federal housing programs reduced during the Reagan Administration,
and succeeded in enacting an Omnibus Housing Reauthorization Bill.'
Additionally, Gonzalez addressed a worsening economy and growing un-
rest in the nation's inner cities. He held a series of hearings around the
country to gather testimony from the people most affected by these con-
ditions. These hearings resulted in Gonzalez's introduction of the Emer-
gency Community Development Act of 1992."
E. Chairman Gonzalez Saves the Savings & Loans
In 1989, Gonzalez became Chair of the Banking Committee, a position
he held for six years.'83 As Chair, he played a leading role in repairing
one of the biggest financial debacles in the nation's history, the near col-
lapse of the savings and loan industry (S&Ls). Gonzalez correctly pre-
dicted such a crisis in the wake of the S&L deregulation of the 1980s. '
Banks and S&L institutions were adversely affected by changing eco-
nomic conditions in the 1970s. After World War II and until the 1970s,
prosperity and financial conservatism combined to keep failure rates neg-
ligible."8 5 This was followed by years of high inflation combined with re-
cessions. Many financial institutions failed during the recession of 1973-
179. See Sweeney, supra note 55, at 15.
180. See Neal R. Peirce, HUD's Brightest Ideas Are Dinined by Its Shortage of Politi-
cal Electricity, WASH. PosT, June 23, 1984, at F14.
181. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L No. 102-550, 106
Stat. 3672 (1992) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
182. See Ann Mariano, Congress to Square Off on Development Funds: Wide Range of
Proposals Seek to Create Jobs, WAS11. Pos-r, Mar. 14, 1992, at 12.
183. See Catalina Camia, Banking Chairman Stumps for Portrait of ilenry B. Gonza-
lez, DALLAS MORNING Nr-ws, July 16, 1995, at 22A.
184. See Kathleen Day, Gonzalez to Offer Plan to Aid Home Buyers; S&L System
Needs Replacing, Legislator Says, WASI. PosT., Dec. 10, 1988, at Cl; Interview with Kelsay
Meek, supra note 26.
185. See, e.g., Andrew Leckly, Interest Rates Cod Catch People Napping. Sr. Loturs
Pos-r-DsPATCH, Jan. 22, 1992, at lB.
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75, with failure rates increasing in 1975 and 1976.186 Institutions began
taking more risks and opening more branches, assisted by liberalized
state laws. Competitive pressures increased and were followed by a pe-
riod of relative stability. As the 1970s closed, spiraling interest rates
placed increased financial pressure on banks.1 87
Leading officials in the Reagan Administration believed that deregula-
tion, i.e., the process of eliminating many rules and regulations that had
unduly constrained business, would stimulate the economy. The S&L in-
dustry lobbyists essentially were allowed to write the deregulation bills
for their industry. Proponents of deregulation argued that the discipline
of the market could replace government involvement and provide ade-
quate control over banks. 188
The two main pieces of deregulation legislation enacted during the
early 1980s were the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA) and the Garn-St. Germain Depository
Institutions Act of 1982 (Garn-St. Germain). 89 DIDMCA was the first
significant piece of deregulation legislation directed at the S&L industry.
This legislation phased out interest rate caps on savings deposits, allowed
the Federal Reserve to determine how much "cash on hand" an S&L was
required to have available as compared to total deposits, authorized
S&Ls to offer NOW accounts which were essentially interest bearing
checking accounts, as well as providing authorization for other consumer
lending services such as credit cards and automobile loans.1 90
The second piece of legislation, Garn-St. Germain, allowed S&Ls to
expand their investment portfolios far beyond residential real estate."'
186. See, e.g., John Crudele, The Market Never Misses on a Rebound, Sr. Louis-Dis-
PATCH, Oct. 2,1990, at 7C; Abstract, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 1984, at 4.
187. See John O'Dell, Economists Agree D.C. Better Duck This Recession Session,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1990, at 5 (revealing that spiraling interest rates triggered the reces-
sion of 1981-82).
188. 131 CONG. Rec. 3360-67 (1985) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez). Gonzalez, in this
speech, specifically criticized the large amount of money loaned to third world countries
that may not be able to repay these loans. See id.
189. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132; Garn St-Germain Depository Institution Act of 1982, Pub.
L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469.
190. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132.
191. The Garn-St. Germain bill passed the House between midnight and I a.m. with
no debate. Because that bill had been written largely in secret, very few were sure what it
meant. Only four Congressmen rose to oppose it: Jim Leach (R-IA.) and three Texans,
Jim Wright (D-TX), Jim Mattox (D-TX), and Henry Gonzalez (D-TX). Molly Ivins, Edi-
torial, Gonzalez Often in Role of First, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Sept. 12, 1997, at
5B. See Molly Ivins, Editorial, If Only We'd Honored Henry B. by Listening, AusIN
AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Sept. 10, 1997, at A15 (mentioning the three Texans).
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S&Ls were permitted to invest in commercial loans'92, make an increased
number of unsecured real estate loans, invest in state and municipal se-
curities,' 93 engage in some direct commercial investing, 94 and generally
expand their flexibility to earn money. 95
Gonzalez strenuously opposed S&L legislation such as the DIDMA
and Garn-St. Germain that loosened accounting and capital standards in
the early 1980s. This legislation was promoted to buy time for institutions
endangered by rising interest rates that made liabilities costly. However,
the loosened regulations only permitted questionable practices to in-
crease and when real estate prices declined, the industry suddenly had an
even larger gap between losses and the capital to cover them. Real estate
declines like the "Texas bust" also magnified the impact of fraudulent
activities such as "land flips". 196
When Gonzalez warned in the mid-1980s that hundreds of savings and
loans-where many thousands of people held their life savings-were
facing bankruptcy, only a few listened. In the end, the S&L bailout cost
American taxpayers $200 billion.'97 Because Gonzalez appeared on the
floor of the House in 1986 to deliver a series of speeches on the condition
of the nation's savings and loans, which he called "My Advice to the Priv-
ileged Orders."19 He knew that working people who had deposited their
hard-earned money in failed savings and loans would be hurt, and hurt
badly. He argued that an increasing number of savings and loans were
declaring insolvency; meaning that they had lost so much money on bad
loans that depositors could not withdraw the money they had deposited
192. See Daniel M. Gropper, Product-line Deregulation and the Cost Structure of U.S.
Saving and Loan Associations, APPLIED ECONOMICS, Feb. 1995, at 183.
193. See Financial, UNITED PRESS INTrM MONA toN, Dec. 4, 1981.
194. See id.
195. See, e.g., Nancy Ross, Panel Allows Htome Mortgages With Variable Itterest Rates,
Variable-Rate Mortgages Approved; Consumer Groups Furious, WAsII. Posr. Apr. 24,
1981, at Al (discussing one aspect of the increased flexibility).
196. See Tanya Rutledge, Developer, Hotels Team for Different Approach to Land
Buys, Bus. J'L, Aug. 11, 1997, at IA (explaining that land flips are transactions where the
buyer never really holds title because it is immediately resold). See also Paula Moore.
RTC's Ghost Lives on; Remains of the S&L Crisis, DI.NvP.R Bus. J't, Oct. 15, 1999, at IA;
Savings-and-Loan Scandals; the Texas Tally, TIlE EcoNoNisr, Feb. 5, 1994, at 26; Memo-
randum from Kelsay Meek, Chief of Staff to Congressman Henry B. Gonzalez, United
States House of Representatives, to Susana Benavidez, Case Worker for Charles Gonzalez,
United States Congressman, United States House of Representatives (May 15. 2000) (on
file with author).
197. Gonzalez was particularly concerned about the adequacy of S&L regulations
since the early 1980s. See Gonzalez Deems Possible Disaster, SAN ANTONIo Limrr, Aug. 9,
1982; Gonzalez Warns of Potential Financial Crisis, SAN ANTONIo Lic;arr, Aug. 28, 1982;
HBG: Peril Loots Without Legislation, SAN ANTONIo Ex'R Ess-NEws, Sept. 17, 1985.
198. 132 CONG. REc. H4949-58 (1986) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez).
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in good faith. 99 Time would vindicate Gonzalez's warnings against these
S&L practices.20 0
Deregulation of the thrifts had created a "law of the jungle," Gonzalez
contended. 2 1' By 1988, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corpo-
rations (FSLIC) was unable to pay the costs of closing down insolvent
institutions. Instead, the FSLIC consolidated insolvents with stronger in-
stitutions and invented paper capital in the form of good will to cover the
gaps. As a result, formerly strong institutions became weaker from a cap-
ital standpoint while new brain-dead affiliates remained open.20 2
F. Financial Institutions Reform and Recovery Enforcement Act
(FIRREA)
The crisis was so immense by the summer of 1988 that Gonzalez pro-
posed a $50 billion fund to clean up the situation, reform capital and ac-
counting standards, and enhance regulation.2"' The industry,
congressional leaders, and the Reagan administration initially ignored
Gonzalez's proposals. A year later, the complex Gonzalez plan became
law - the Financial Institutions Reform and Recovery Enforcement Act
(FIRREA). °4 FIRREA was responsible for reorganizing the nation's
thrift industry and was enacted to "stop the bleeding," restore consumer
199. See Findings of Booz-Allen & Hamilton Study of FHLBB: Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Gen. Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Banking, Fi-
nance, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 30 (1987) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez).
200. See Michael King, Capitol Chronicle: The Legacy of Henry B. Gonzalez, Aus rIN
CIIRON., Dec. 8, 2000, available at http:www.auschron.com/issues/dispatchl/2000-1208/
polscapitol.html.
201. Sweeney, supra note 55, at 26.
202. Loan officials attempted to avoid liquidation and to find options to revive the
banking institutions. See, e.g., David J. Shaffer, Gonzalez Pushes for Rescue of Failed Val-
ley S&L, SAN ANTONIO LIGHT, Aug. 11, 1987, at BI; Valley S&L Studied to Determine
Needs, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-NEws, June 3, 1987. See also Interview with Kelsay Meek,
supra note 26.
203. See Sweeney, supra note 55, at 26; Memorandum from Kelsay Meek, former
Chief of Staff for Henry B. Gonzalez, United States Congressman, United States House of
Representatives, to Susana Benavidez, Caseworker for Charles Gonzalez, United States
Congressman, United States House of Representatives (May 15, 2000) (on file with au-
thor). See, e.g., FSLIC Rescue Bill Isn't Generous Enough, SAN ANTONIO LIGIrr, Apr. 12,
1987; Subcommittee Oks FSLIC Bailout Plan, SAN ANTONIO EXmREss-NEws, Apr. 1, 1987;
Interview with Kelsay Meek, supra note 26.
204. See Courier New Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act
of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989). See also Subcommittee Oks FSLIC
Bailout Plan, SAN ANTONIO ExpiREss-NEws, Apr. 1, 1987.
[Vol. 3:1
CHAMPION OF SOCIAL EQUALITY
confidence, and continue to provide a means for affordable home
financing.205
Nationwide, thousands of S&Ls failed. Regulators noted that at least
44% of Texas savings and loan institutions had gone bankrupt.206 Gonza-
lez argued that government assistance to S&L depositors was necessary
in order to ensure fair treatment to local savings account holders and
borrowers.2 "7 Without this assistance, he believed that many communi-
ties, especially poor communities, would not have access to lenders when
attempting to buy homes or start small businesses.2"s What was impor-
tant was not helping S&L owners and officials, he stressed; what mattered
were the ordinary people who needed to have a safe place in their com-
munity to save their money, as well as a place to borrow money.2"
During a 1987 congressional hearing, Gonzalez expressed his frustra-
tion with the Congressional actions that contributed to the crisis by
stating:
[Tjhe thing that I have resented all along is that we in the Congress
have forgotten what we are here for. We are not here for the benefit
of these banking institutions. We are here for the benefit of deposi-
tors ... I have sat here on this [House] committee for 26 years. I
have seen committee after committee; do everything the industry has
asked us to do. Everything the industry has wanted the Congress has
rolled over and given to them ... and the results are plain.2 0
An important, and overlooked, provision of FIRREA required the
Home Loan Banks to contribute to an Affordable Housing Program
(AHP). 11 The Banks fought the proposal, but the program proved pop-
205. 135 CONG. REc. 18,558 (Aug. 3, 1989) (statement of Rep. Gonzale'z). Interview
with Kelsay Meek, supra note 26.
206. FSLIC Rescue Bill Isn't Generous Enough. SAN AiONio Liuirr. Apr. 12, 1987.
See generally 135 CONG. REc. 3237 (1989) (indicating that S&L failures produced huge
losses in Texas).
207. See Sweeney, supra note 55, at 96.
208. See, e.g., Day, supra note 184 (stresiing that Gonzalez supported a system of
homeownership to fulfill S&L's duty); Ann Marizino, Congress to Square Off on Develop-
ment Funds, Wide Range of Proposals Seek to Create Jobs, WAsAii. Pos-r, Mar. 14, 1992, at
F2. See generally Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 2901-2908 (West Supp.
2000) (adopted to encourage financial institutions to "help meet the credit needs of the
local communities").
209. See Day, supra note 184.
210. Findings of Booz-Alien & Hamilton Study of FHLBB, supra note 199.
211. See Letter from Kelsay Meek, former Chief of Staff for Henry B. Gonzalez,
United States Congressman, United States House of Representatives, to Chris Anglim,
Government Documents Librarian, Sarita Kenedy East Law Library, St. Mary's University
School of Law, (Aug. 5, 2000) (on file with author): Interview with Kelsay Meek. Fupra
note 26.
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ular. In a short amount of time, AHP created $1 billion in housing
development."' 2
The federal government formed the Resolution Trust Corporation
(RTC) to resolve the problems of bankrupt savings and loans.2 1 3 Repeat-
edly, the RTC returned to Congress, asserting the bailout was going to
cost far more than previously estimated. Many members of Congress re-
sisted and did not want to spend the money, especially in election
years.2 14 Almost single-handedly Gonzalez worked to obtain the funding
necessary to complete the task. Unlike other proposals, Gonzalez's bill
called on the healthy savings and loans to pay for some of the cost of the
bailout. 15 Today the banking industry remains strong and well regu-
lated.216 More than anyone else, Gonzalez was responsible for the clean
up of the S&L industry's accounting, business, and regulatory structure.
Gonzalez introduced H.R. 1340 in the 103d Congress (1993-1994) to
release previously appropriated funds and to resolve remaining failed and
failing S&L institutions.2" 7 The bill, signed into law, appropriated these
funds to complete the S&L clean up, protect depositors and stabilize the
system. 218 When finally completed, the cost of the clean up was about
$50 billion less than many had predicted (which totaled $90 billion).2 II
Overall, the Banking Committee under Congressman Gonzalez's lead-
ership held more than 500 hearings and obtained enactment of 71 bills.
Other bills that the Committee produced include restructuring the federal
deposit insurance system to provide depositors a greater guarantee for
their savings, making more credit available to small business, reauthoriz-
212. See id.
213. See, e.g., Sue Schmidt & Jerry Knight, Short-Term Fianancingfor S&L Cleanup is
Near, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1990, A10.
214. Editorial, More Money for the S&L's, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1990 (describing the
financing of the bailout and giving a specific example of campaign year tentativeness). See
also Interview with Kelsay Meek, supra note 26.
215. See Bill Would Impose Levy on Healthy S&Ls, S.F. CuION., Apr. 4, 1992, at B2.
See generally Schmidt & Knight, supra note 213 (explaining some of the political contro-
versy behind the S&L bailout).
216. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 54 (1996) (noting
that the banking industry is highly regulated); Jennifer Manvell Jeannot, Note, An Interna-
tional Perspective on Domestic Banking Reform: Could the European Union's Second
Banking Directive Revolutionize the Way the United States Regulates its Own Financial Ser-
vices Industry?, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1715, 1716; Interview with Kelsay Meek, supra
note 26.
217. See LEGISLATION SPONSORED By REi'RESEINTX'VE HuNRY B. GONZAiEZ 1962-
1997 (1997) (on file with author).
218. See Resolution Trust Corporation Completion Act, Pub. L. No. 103-204, 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 2369.
219. See Sweeney, supra note 55, at 26
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ing federal housing laws, and strengthening the laws against financial
crimes.
220
G. Investigation of the President
Gonzalez also gained considerable national publicity in 1992, when he
demanded an investigation of the Bush administration's involvement in
loans to Iraq.22 In 1990, as Chair of the Banking Committee, Gonzalez
investigated the origins of the Persian Gulf War and the extent to which
foreign financial interests in the US may have influenced American for-
eign policy. This investigation may have led him to focus on the role
played by the Banca Nazionale del Lavaro (BNL) in assisting Iraq build
its military during a period in which that country had virtually no credit
on global markets. Gonzalez began with a hearing on October 16, 1990,
and soon after, authorized a full-scale investigation, which lasted from
1991 through 1992.222
V. LEGACY OF THE BREAKTHROUGHi
A. The Historic Standing of the Gonzalez Political Legacy
After being elected, Gonzalez consistently helped his constituents ac-
complish their own political, economic, and social breakthroughs. He
was one of the most articulate Texas Hispanic leaders to advocate for
equal access to all economic, judicial, and political spheres of American
life. He also helped reform the social order that once subordinated Texas
Hispanics. He worked for equality within the system and clearly stated
his intentions to assist all of the people in his district.
Gonzalez strongly supported the integrationist ideals of Brown v.
Board of Education2" and the Civil Rights Movement. He favored a plu-
220. See 143 CONG. REc. H8575 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1997) (statement of Rep. Ciro Rod-
riguez). See also Interview with Kelsay Meek, supra note 26 (explaining that only one of
Gonzalez's banking bills did not become law and that was because he had decided to kill
it).
221. See 138 CONG. Rac. 28,34-53 (1992). See also King, supra note 200.
222. "The BNL Affair and Regulation and Supervision of U.S. Branches and Agencies
of Foreign Banks," Hearings, Oct. 16, 1990. Serial 101-178; "The Role of BNL in Financing
Iraq, The Failure of the Federal Reserve Bank Under the Federal "Umbrella" Bank Regula-
tory Structure, and Interference by the State of Illinois," Staff Report, Feb. 1991. Committee
Print 102-1; and, "Iraqi and BNL Participation in Erport-linport Programs," Hearings,
Apr. 17, 1991, Serial 102-21. See also Interview with Kelsay Meek, supra note 26. Meek
comments that the signature of these investigations were that they showed how some for-
eign institutions were: 1) acting contrary to U.S. interests; 2) that there was inadequate
regulation of their activities; and 3) that there was an unhealthy relationship between legis-
lators, regulations and these institutions. See id.
223. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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ralist model of politics with all racial and ethnic groups having equal ac-
cess to the political process. He believed that all Americans should be
included and work within the American polity. In San Antonio, the de-
veloping Mexican American civil and political rights era coincided with
the Anglo elite's desire to maintain an environment free of political and
social conflict. Consequently, as in national politics, consensus took pre-
cedence over conflict. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, Anglo-American
political leaders across the Southwest perpetuated the modernization
process that subsequently integrated Mexican Americans politically, so-
6ially, and economically.224
Henry Gonzalez's landmark historic political challenges and victories
left a very special political legacy. Gonzalez's victories represent the His-
panic struggle for full recognition as American citizens throughout the
United States. Mexican American leaders in San Antonio, in particular,
viewed electoral success as the most important public vehicle for achiev-
ing political respectability and equal status with Anglos. Hence, Gonza-
lez's election victories were major victories for San Antonio's Hispanics.
He became the first Hispanic member of the San Antonio city council
and of the state senate since 1846. Unlike subsequent Hispanic politi-
cians, Gonzalez had neither Hispanic precursors nor access to the politi-
cal culture that later fostered open electoral alliances between Mexican
Americans and Anglos. Indeed his capable leadership and his ability to
transcend the narrowness of ethnic politics while in office helped create
the model that later politicians such as Henry Cisneros used to become
mayor of San Antonio and Frederico Pena used to become mayor of
Denver. 2 5
Moreover, Gonzalez's election revealed that Mexican Americans were
able to successfully organize in support of one of their own candidates.
Led by leaders such as Gonzalez, they began to understand local politics,
and how to overcome political obstacles. They did not seek to overthrow
the established political culture of San Antonio but overcame its barriers
through the application of political talent, skillful organization, diligence,
and dedication. 2 6
Gonzalez's early elections forced the Anglo establishment to respect
the political potential of Mexican Americans. Gonzalez's electoral victo-
224. See R.A. GARCIA, supra note 27, at 303.
225. See Louis DESIPIo, COUNTING ON THE LATINO VOTE: LAINOS AS A NEW ELEC.
"rORATE 116 (1996) (describing the electoral success of Hispanic mayoral candidates includ-
ing Frederico Pena); ROSALES, supra note 39, at 142-46 (examining the political rise of
Henry Cisneros); Interview with Kelsay Meek, supra note 26.
226. See ACURA, supra note 38, at 442. See also Neal R. Peirce & Jerry Hagstrom,
The Hispanic Community-A Growing Force to Be Reckoned With, in LATINOS AN[) .'111C
Poi rriCAL SYSTEM 11, 15 (F. Chris Garcia ed., 1988).
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ries compelled the Anglo elite to accept a "culture of accommodation" in
which Mexican Americans exercised an increasingly greater political role.
Furthermore, Gonzalez's political success inspired other Mexican Ameri-
cans to run for major political offices. As a result, Hispanics began to
increase their political representation on the city, county, and state
levels.' 7
Gonzalez's early election victories successfully defined the Mexican
American struggle for civil and political rights. He defied his skeptics'
belief that Mexican Americans were too divided and individualistic to
succeed in electoral politics. Despite Gonzalez's many landmark accom-
plishments in Congress, he never lost touch with his constituents or his
community. His tireless devotion for serving San Antonio's ordinary
people made him a revered figure.' Gonzalez's electoral success was a
leading example of the political emergence of post-World War II Mexican
Americans -a generation who fought and sacrificed for the survival of
American democracy.2 29 Once peace returned, this generation sought to
participate in the governance of both civic and political arenas.230
B. The Gonzalez Legacy in Hispanic Political Participation
Gonzalez's major political contributions include his breakthrough ef-
forts in eliminating barriers faced by ethnic minorities in becoming politi-
cally involved. Due to his efforts at overcoming the barriers, Hispanic
political involvement in the United States is entering a new phase. One
aspect of the Gonzalez legacy is the increase in Hispanic political repre-
sentation. For example, the number of elected Hispanics in Texas in-
creased from 565 in 1973 to 1,572 in 1988.3' By 1993, there were 2,030
227. See Richard Martinez, Motivation of Latino Voters for Political Empowerment, 14
CHICANo-LATINO LAW REVIEW 103, 105 (1994); Chris Anglim, Editorial, Legacy Preserved
for the Future, SAN ANTONIo EXpRss-NEws, Dec. 2, 2000, at 7B; Southwest Voter Regis-
tration Education Project, The Handbook of Texas Online, available at http/I
www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/artices/viewlSS/wcsl.html.
228. See Garcia, supra note 5. In many homes, it became common to see pictures of
Gonzalez along with President John F. Kennedy and the Virgin Mary. See Paul Houston,
Rep. Gonzalez: He Packs a Punch When It Gets Tense, LA. Tims. July 15, 1990, at Al;
Interview with Kelsay Meek, supra note 26.
229. See, e.g., R.A. GARCIA, supra note 27, at 302-10. Mexican Americans embarked
upon an era of "new consciousness" - with a bold identity that was less introspective and
more communal in focus. See id at 302. The author states that "World War I1 ... served as
a catalyst ... for Mexicans and Mexican Americans, and thereby, increased their sense of
rising expectations. Id.
230. See R.A. GARCIA, supra note 27, at 303.
231. See Southwest Voter Registration Education Project, The Handbook of Texas On-
line, available at http:llwv.tsha.utexas.edu/handbookonlinelarticesfviewvSSIwcsl.htm
(last modified Feb. 15, 1999).
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Hispanic elected officials in Texas. 3 2 In 1998, five Hispanic members of
the United States Congress2 33 were from Texas; including Gonzalez, the
other members were: Henry Bonilla, Eligio "Kika" de ]a Garza, Solomon
Ortiz, and Frank Tejeda. 34
Hispanics have increasingly gained importance in national elections;
furthermore, they have traditionally been strong supporters of Demo-
cratic candidates. 235 Jimmy Carter courted Hispanics with greater inten-
sity than had previous Democrats and heavily relied on them in the 1976
presidential election. During that election, Hispanics provided Carter the
winning margin to win both Texas and Ohio. In order to reduce the tradi-
tionally Democratic Hispanic vote (81% for Carter in 1976), Republicans
created a Republican National Hispanic Assembly rivaling the Demo-
cratic National Committee's Hispanic Affairs Division.236 In 1980,
Jimmy Carter also needed Hispanics to first win the nomination and to
retain the White House.2 3 7 During the Carter years, Hispanics held more
significant high-level administration positions than in any previous ad-
ministration.238 In the ensuing twenty years, Hispanic political influence
has increased in significance.2 39
Candidates in more recent presidential elections have regarded the
Hispanic population as an important segment of voters, and have actively
sought their votes. As a result of the concentrated Hispanic population in
232. See TIM B. HEATON, BRUCE A. CHADWICK, & CARDELL K. JACOBSON, STArsITi-
CAL HANDBOOK ON RACIAL GiouPs IN THE UNITED STATES 317.
233. See, e.g., Larry Hufford, The Velasquez Legacy, Tex. OBSERVER, July 29, 1988, at
12.
234. See Lisa Montoya, Senor Smith Didn't Go to Washington, in AWASII IN "rie
MAINSTREAM 158 (Rodolfo 0. de la Garza & Louis DeSipio eds. 1999). Latino represent-
atives in Texas were reelected by safe margins in the 1996 elections. Id. These included
Solomon Ortiz of Corpus Christi, Henry B. Gonzalez of San Antonio, Frank Tejeda of
South San Antonio, and Republican Henry Bonilla of Southwest Texas. Id.
235. See DESIlO, supra note 225 at 29.
236. Some Hispanics became prominent figures in the Republican parly during the
Nixon and Reagan administrations. See Peggy Simpson, Mexican Americans Hold High
Posts, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-NEws, Aug. 3, 1970, at 13A. But see Gonzalez Press Re-
lease, undated, held in Gonzalez Archives (rebutting that claim).
237. See Dick Kirschten, The Hispanic Vote - Parties Can't Gamble That the Sleeping
Giant Won't Awaken, NAT'L J., Nov. 19, 1983, at 2410.
238. See, e.g., RODNEY E. HERO, LATINOS AND THE U.S. POLITICAL SYSTEM: Two-
TIERED PLURALISM 86 (1996); Michael J. Gerhardt, Modeling a Judiciary on the Mistakes
of the Past, NEW JERSEY L.J., Nov. 16, 1992, at 15; Neal R. Peirce & Jerry Hagstrom,
Democratic Primaries in California and Texas May Hinge on Chicano Vote, NAT'L J., Apr.
26, 1980, at 681; Diane Curtis, Washington News, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, Apr. 25,
1981.
239. See Curtis, supra note 238; Peirce & Hagstrom, supra note 238; Gerhardt, supra
note 238.
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states with a large numbers of electoral votes,24' Hispanics gained influ-
ence during the 2000 presidential election.24" ' In addition to gaining influ-
ence and attention, Hispanic voters demonstrated their political diversity
and unpredictability.24 2 Prior to the election, estimates indicated that the
percentage of Hispanic votes would rise from 4.7% to 5.4% in 2000.243
Overall, the United States has experienced a substantial shift in racial
demographics during the last third of the twentieth century, which was
represented by a proportional increase in Hispanics and Asian Ameri-
cans.244 The Hispanic population grew much faster than the Anglo and
African American populations as a result of immigration and higher birth
rates.245
There are more than 21 million Hispanics now living in the United
States - approximately 9% of the nation's population. 46 Although His-
panics frequently find political power elusive because they traditionally
have a low voter turnout, both major parties and their candidates actively
court the Hispanic electorate. Hispanics for example, are estimated as
30% of the Texas population, but account for only 15% of registered vot-
ers.2 47 Many Hispanics say they do not follow political issues because
240. States such as Texas, California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, and New York have
a high Hispanic population, and are also assigned the highest electoral votes.
241. See Jonathan Alter, et al., Hispanic Power at the Polls, NEwswrFk, July 4. 1983,
at 23. Compare Michael Janofsky, Candidates Come Calling As Latino Influence Grows.
N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2000, at 15A (detailing the huge impact that Latinos had on the 2000
election), with JOAN MOORE & HARRY PACHON, HISPANICS IN THE UNITED STA-rns 184-86
(1985) (discussing the rise in Hispanic voters in the 1980s).
242. See Sherry Sylvester, Latino Vote Expected to Hit Record this Year, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESs-NEws, Sep. 4, 2000, at 1 A.
243. See, e.g., Michael Janofsky, Candidates Courting Hispanic Vote, N.Y. TltN:s. June
25, 2000, at 1.
244. See R.A. GARCIA, supra note 27, at 302 (noting an increase in urbanization and
indicating a more politically active Mexican American population); ROSAUY-S, supra note
39, at 11, 181 (tracing the increase in the U.S. population, including Hispanics, between
1950 and 1980). See also Sylvester, supra note 242 (identifying the various changes caused
by the rise in the Hispanic population).
245. See THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC, DEMiOG;RAPIIIC AND FISCAL Et-r(-s OF
IMMIGRATION 28 (James P. Smith & Barry Edmonston, eds. 1997) (noting the impact of
immigration on the United States population). See also Orlando Rodriguez, The Nest, Iin-
migrant Hispanic Population: An Integrated Approach to Preventing Delinquency and
Crime, at http:J/www.ncjrs.org/txtilesfhispop.txt (last visited Feb. 22, 2001) (stating that the
Hispanic population increased 50% between 1980 and 1990).
246. See Rodriguez, supra note 245.
247. See, e.g., John A. Booth, Merely Ambivalent? A Comnent ori Skerrv"s Mexican
Americans, in THE TOMAS RIVERA CENTER, MEXICAN AMi-RILCANS: ARE TIHEY AN Ai-
BIVALENT MINORITY? 77 (Lisa Magafia, ed., 1994) (estimating the Hispanic population in
Texas as more than 20%); State of Tex. Health & Human Services Comm'n. Population
Projections for Texas: Years 1990-2030 by Gender and Race/Edhnicity, at http'//I
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they no longer believe their vote can change anything. Others are unfa-
miliar with political issues because they are illiterate or can only read
Spanish. Another exception is that Hispanic voters tend to be younger
than the rest of the population, and young people generally do not value
voting. Thus, Hispanic political leaders have the continuing challenge to
make Hispanics aware that their potential political power can make a
difference.
Nevertheless, Hispanic participation in the electoral process is increas-
ing. In 1996, the number of registered Hispanic voters rose to 5.4 million
from 4.2 million in 1992, and has continued to rise sharply. 248 In the 1994
Congressional election, about 3.5 million Hispanics voted, while 4.1 mil-
lion Hispanics voted in the 1998 Congressional election.249
Some studies have found that Hispanics are not as politically unified as
they were in the 1960s and 1970s. There is no political party monopoly on
the Hispanic vote because of their divergent political philosophies.
Scholars have noted that studies of comparative ethnic politics fail to ex-
plain the dynamics of American ethnic politics for Latinos.2 50 During the
1980s, Republicans succeeded in appealing to a small, but growing, num-
ber of African Americans and Hispanics, partly because the party
stressed a new sense of inclusion. Republicans argue that the Great Soci-
ety generation of Hispanic leaders is fading, while younger, post 1960s
Hispanics are concerned about jobs and education, and are joining the
GOP. 2 1 Many younger Hispanics are said to be conservative both fis-
cally and socially. This group of Latinos suffers disproportionately from
the effects of crime. They are also concerned with lower quality schools
that many of their children are forced to attend.252 While Hispanics are
united by language and cultural characteristics, articulating a common
agenda has become more difficult because of differences on individual,
social, and economic issues. Many in the Hispanic community have
www.hhsc.state.tx.uslcons-bud/dssi/txpop902030.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2001) (projcct-
ing the Hispanic population in Texas as approximately 31%).
248. See Growing Hispanic Vote is Courted by Gore; Latinos Could Play Significant
Roles in Key States in 2000 Election, ST. Louis PoSr-DISPATCti, July 29, 1999, at A8.
249. See Press Release, Jennifer C. Day, Number of Hispanics Who Vote Up Sharply,
Census Bureau Reports, U.S. Dept. of Commerce News, Aug. 29, 2000 (on file with
author).
250. See, e.g., DESim'o, supra note 225, at 8.
251. See Mary Lenz, Hispanic Voters: Could Swing Election, Assoc. PRilss, Nov. 2,
1994, available at 1994 WL 3365796.
252. See, e.g., Growing Hispanic Vote is Courted by Gore: Latinos Could Play Signifi-
cant Roles in Key States in 2000 Election, supra note 248; Lenz, supra note 251.
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stressed that, despite the political progress made so far, there is a crucial
need to politically empower Hispanics as a group.2s3
Hispanics have traditionally supported Democratic candidates, with
Democrats winning about two-thirds of this vote in recent years and have
a three-to-one advantage in party identity.-' Many Hispanics, however,
have shown open-mindedness toward Republicans in recent elections.
The most assimilated Hispanics with conservative social positions, in par-
ticular, tend to favor Republican policies and candidates. By some esti-
mates, then Texas Governor Bush won as much as 47% of the Hispanic
vote in his reelection as governor in 1998. Meanwhile, Tony Garza, a
Latino Republican, won re-election as Texas Railroad Commissioner, a
powerful position overseeing oil, gas and public utilities.2 5
Hispanics were regarded as a battleground constituency in the 2000
election when Democratic strategists determined early on that they were
"very Democratic in their orientation, Democratic in their issues assess-
ment, Democratic in their congressional vote, but very Republican in
their support for George W. Bush." 6 Governor Bush won approxi-
mately 33% of the Hispanic vote in Texas, more than doubling the per-
centage of Hispanics voting for Dole in 1996.257 Nationwide, Bill Clinton
won 72% of the Hispanic vote in 1996, while Al Gore won 62% of that
vote in 2000.258
Having been precluded from playing a meaningful role in American
democracy, Hispanics have long sought to improve their political, eco-
nomic, and social situation. They have largely retained "interest group"
thinking, but have also accepted the necessity of coalition building. In
253. See, e.g., Lenz, supra note 251; LINDA CltAVI;Z, OuT Of -H1t- BARRI: TOWAID A
NEw PoLIrIcs OF HISPANIC AssIIlATION (1991). One prominent Hispanic member of
the Reagan administration argued that any monocultural view of Hispanics ignores the
community's racial and ethnic diversity, and does not account for class analysis. Id. Ms.
Chavez expressly and impliedly criticized several tenets of leftist and LatCrit thought, in-
cluding that: bilingualism is valuable, total assimilation is to be resisted, affirmative action
and diversity are unqualified goods, Hispanics are disadvantaged as are African Ameri-
cans, and the true voice of the Hispanic community is a rebellious one. IdL
254. See Dana Milbank, Latino Voters Get a Lot of Lip Service, CIi.tvFLtANt PI.AIN-
DEALER, May 30, 2000, at 713.
255. See Tony Garza, Bush Offers Opportunities to Minorities, DALLAS MoI N;
NEws, Feb. 13, 2000, at 6J; Michael Janofsky, Candidates Courting Hispanic Vote, N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 2000, at 14.
256. Gebe Martinez, Democrats, GOP Court Hispanic Voters. DLm-Rott Nrws. Mar. 5,
2000, at 13.
257. See Patricia Kilday Hart, Deciphering the Vote Count, Ttx. Momiil [Y. Jaian. 2001,
at 19.
258. See Michael Fletcher, Politics; Former Atlanta Mayer to Chalenge Clinton Friend
for Top DNC Post, WASH. Pos-r, Dec. 24, 2000, at A9; Harold Meyerson, Forget Those
Supremes, LA WEEKLY, Dec 22, 2000, at 15.
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many cases, Hispanics have formed enduring coalitions at local levels and
in international circles. Hispanics have joined and helped create coali-
tions across economic, social, cultural, legal, and political lines on issues
including trade, labor, criminal justice, health, and religious matters. His-
panics have realized that coalition politics often requires compromise, but
also means not relinquishing their own culture.
Of crucial importance to their viability as political actors in American
democracy, Hispanics have demonstrated a willingness to enter into alli-
ances with non-Latinos. However, there continues to be a wide political
and economic gap between Anglos and Hispanics. Although equal to
Anglo Americans under the law, Hispanics have consistently been une-
qual politically and economically. The political disenfranchisement of
Hispanics has largely been shaped by a combination of conquest, ar-
ranged immigration, and other forms of hegemonic domination. The po-
litical influence that Hispanics enjoy today developed over the course of
recent American history, and would not have been possible without the
sacrifice and tireless efforts of leaders such as Henry B. Gonzalez.25'
C. El Compadre Gonzalez Returns Home, 1998 - 2000.
Often, many of his constituents referred to Gonzalez as "El Compadre
Gonzalez", because they admired him and considered him as almost part
of the family. For 37 years, Gonzalez displayed signs outside his Wash-
ington D.C. and San Antonio, Texas offices, stating: "This office belongs
to the people of the 20th Congressional District, Texas." Gonzalez said,
"I didn't put it there just because it looks good ... I have never neglected
any group, no matter what., 260 In 45 years of remarkable public service,
Gonzalez fought for housing for the poor, championed the civil rights of
ethnic minorities, and led the successful cleanup of the savings and loan
and banking crises. In crusading for many unpopular causes, he demon-
strated a tremendous amount of character - he made courageous stands
on some of the most controversial issues of the day. Gonzalez zealously
sought to defend the rights of the most vulnerable by fighting for the
American ideal of equal rights for all.261
Henry B. Gonzalez served the people of his district as long as his
health permitted. In 1998, however, Gonzalez retired from Congress suf-
fering from a damaged heart valve, caused by a dental infection, which
259. See Katz, supra note 42. See also Peggy Fikaq, Many South-Central Texans in
Politics Followed the Leader, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESs-NEws, Nov. 28, 2000, at 13A.
260. Garcia, supra note 5.
261. See id. See also Interview with Kelsay Meek, supra note 26.
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had spread to his heart.26 2 In his last term, his illness caused him to miss
fourteen months of the two-year session, keeping him home in San
Antonio.263
Many accolades accompanied Gonzalez's departure; for instance, Rep-
resentative Ken Bentsen (D-TX), who served on the House Banking
Committee with Gonzalez for four years, said, "Texas is losing the pre-
mier voice for housing issues for the nation. He also is kind of the last of
the old bulls, of which Texas used to have quite a few. In some respects
it's the end of an era."'264 Succeeding Henry B. Gonzalez in Congress was
his son Charles, winning that seat in the November 1998 Congressional
election.265
Gonzalez left Congress as an icon. He was the Dean of the Texas dele-
gation and as the longest serving Hispanic member of Congress. Henry
B. Gonzalez tenaciously crusaded for the common man by: respecting
the rights of others; expanding economic opportunity for all; responding
with integrity and fairness to his constituents. Such is a legacy that stands
the test of time as our nation accepts the challenges and opportunities of
the new century. San Antonio has indeed lost one of its greatest champi-
ons in history, but his legend and legacy remain.2 6
262. See Carmina Danini, Lawmaker Leaves a Grand Legacy. SAN ANro.to Ex-
PREsS-NEWS, Nov. 28, 2000, at Al.
263. See Garcia, supra note 5.
264. Harmon, supra note 156.
265. Congressman Charles Gonzalez described the contrast between his style and that
of his father as being a product of different eras: "The era that my father grew up in. in
which his principles and values were formed, was totally different than my own ... ie was
a product of a time when discrimination was open and obvious. We are products of a
different process." Gregory Rodriquez, New Latino Leaders Move Beyond Old Ap-
proacles, AuS-TIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Feb. 1, 1999, at A7.
266. See Carmina Danini, supra note 262.
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